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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Anti-personnel Landmine Regulation1 mandates an “overall assessment” of all EC mine 
action every three years.  This report contains the first such assessment which is for the period 
2002-2004. 
 
The total funding by all EC budget lines for 2002-2004 for mine action was about 116M€, of 
which the horizontal mine action budget line was nearly 40% at 45M€.  The total for the same 
period for all EU mine action, including contributions by Member States, was about 410M€, of 




The broad mandate of overall assessment was approached by focusing on the methods and 
processes used by the European Commission for implementing mine action.  Four areas were 
considered: (i) how the APL Regulation was used to generate the mine action strategy (ii) how 
the strategy was used to implement the multi-annual programme (iii) how projects were selected 
and contracted in order to achieve the programme objectives and (iv) the evaluation and 
assessment processes used.   
 
A range of methods was used for data gathering: document, database and internet searches 
and analysis, interviews with staff in Brussels, telephone interviews with key organization staff, 
questionnaires to delegations and project implementers, and three field missions (to Somalia, 
Azerbaijan and Bosnia & Herzegovina) to meet delegation staff and visit projects. 
 
Key findings and recommendations 
 
The evaluation team recognises that EC staff have consistently sought to achieve high 
standards – this report should be read in the context that the key criticisms are not of the out-
comes (nor of the individuals concerned in mine action) but of some of the methods, processes 
and systems used.  Improvements to these could reduce the difficulty and stress related to 
implementing mine action, as well as potentially improving the outcome and, in particular, the 
value for money.  It should be noted that, while there is room for improvement, in the opinion of 
the evaluation team the EC manages its mine action programme at least as well as other similar 
international donors.  The criticisms in this report should be seen in the light of the overall 
success so far, which has been achieved in political support as well as direct mine action. 
 
1. Whilst the evaluation team is in general agreement with the selection of countries and 
projects funded in the programme, the process by which they had been selected was not 
readily apparent.  This exposes the Commission to the risk of criticism and exposes the staff 
making the decisions to a lot of pressure.  The evaluation team strongly recommends 
implementing a transparent, objective process, such as multi-criteria analysis, to make 
strategic decisions and to include key actors in setting the criteria and weightings.  Other 
management tools are also of value in this process, including Project Cycle Management 
which is already widely used by EuropeAid. 
 
2. Priority should be given by Brussels staff to strategic activities.  Deconcentration is a timely 
opportunity which should be used to maximum effect to lift some of the load imposed by 
detailed day to day project management and free up staff time.  There is an urgent need for 
                                                 
1 Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in developing countries, and Regulation (EC) No 1725/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries.  
Together these are known as “the Anti-personnel Landmine Regulation”. 
Global assessment of EC mine policy and actions: 2002-2004.  Final report. March 2005 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  Page     vi 
improved coordination of project implementation and tracking between different budget 
lines, and improved data management to support this.  There is a need to clarify “who does 
what” in mine action in the EC for the benefit of administrative staff and project 
implementers, as well as the public. 
 
3. Insufficient good project proposals are available.  Both broadening the proposal base, and 
reducing the percentage of bids rejected on technicalities are necessary as a matter of 
urgency.  This should promote increased competition, which can be expected to give better 
value.  Further use of commercial operators (in accordance with the Regulation) should be 
included.  However, support to natural monopolies such as National Mine Action Authorities 
should be continued.  Improving understanding by project proposers of the Commission 
documentation is a first step to very significantly reducing the large percentage of proposals 
rejected on technicalities. 
 
4. Proposal and project assessment has not included a rigorous technical component, and this 
has led to some inefficiency.  Assessment must be done on both programme criteria and 
also on rigorous technical criteria.  Mechanisms are available to undertake this and should 
be more fully used.  The relatively small extra cost will be more than compensated by 
potential gains in efficiency and the reduced risk of poor quality projects which fail to deliver 
good results.  Since the Regulation was drafted there have been significant advances in the 
International Mine Action Standards, they are now the de facto international standard and 
provide a useful basis for independent and authoritative project assessment. 
 
5. Greater contractual rigour is needed to make sure that responsibility and authority are 
commensurate, are clearly stated in the project documents, and are enforced in practice.  
Put bluntly, the Commission must learn to insist on better value for money. Contracting is a 
powerful tool that could be better used.  Better use could be made of the services of agents 
as intermediaries to create synergies and share implementation costs where appropriate.   
 
6. Greater support should be given to implementing both existing and new technologies in the 
field – significant savings in the longer term will require some increased expenditure now.  
Programme and contract requirements should be changed to permit implementers to 
recover the initial costs and benefit from investments in technology, over five year, or longer, 
periods.  Current practice effectively prohibits the use of more efficient methods by usually 
issuing short, non-renewable contracts.   
 
7. Any intervention must have a clear exit strategy, not only for sound development practice 
but to reduce the risk of the EC being held hostage to bad publicity and ill feeling. 
 
8. The political achievements of the EC in mine action have been notable. The European 
Institutions have been at the forefront of the success of the Ottawa process and subsequent 
successes in campaigning for support and ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.  A 
considerable part of this success is due the efforts and personal dedication of the small 
team responsible.  The European Institutions derive real value from visibility of these 
policies. 
 
A continuous thread running through the assessment is the impact of the Deconcentration 
process which was undertaken during the period covered by this Report. This will, it is hoped, 
have a positive impact on mine action, though there are negative effects too, in particular due to 
the fragmentation of project management and the consequent increased difficulty in technical 
assessment.   
 
The report includes suggestions for some changes to update the Regulation in view of the 
advances in mine action in recent years.  The evaluation team notes that the original drafting is 
very clear and well-focussed and the changes suggested are minor. 
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Both the original mandate and also the Terms of Reference of this assessment include 
providing suggestions for improvements to the Regulation.  The evaluation team found the 
Regulation to be well written, clear and well focussed.  All the suggestions made below are 
minor changes: two are needed to clarify a detail points where the team consider the wording 




When the regulation was drafted, mine action in general, and the Ottawa process2 in particular, 
were considerably less advanced than today.  As a result, the regulation has a very strong focus 
on Anti-personnel Landmines to the exclusion of other types of mine and the near exclusion of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO).3  This was appropriate at the time but amendments should now 
be considered in order to make the Regulation consistent with the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) definition of humanitarian demining which includes the clearance of all 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) to a verifiable standard and a known depth.  (It is, of course, 
not possible in practice to clear only APLs and leave other types of contamination).  There is 
also an increasing recognition that the target of mine action should focus more on impact 
reduction than the elimination of all mines and UXO: given the level of residual contamination in 
northern Europe from the two World Wars4 this latter goal is clearly not necessary for impact to 
be reduced and economic recovery to take place.  
 
In some countries abandoned ammunition dumps are a direct explosion threat due to poor 
storage conditions (and the consequences of an explosion can scatter munitions over a wide 
area), and are also a potential source of munitions for looters who may be seeking to reignite 
conflicts or simply to dismantle ordnance in order to sell the scrap metal – this latter is an 
extraordinarily risky activity.  However, abandoned but unused munitions are often neither 
mines nor UXO5 so they are not currently covered by the Regulation.  
 
The close linkage between mine action and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) limitation is 
increasingly recognised in international fora.  The evaluation team recommend that this linkage 
should be recognised formally in the text of the Regulation. 
 
Recommendations for amendments: 
 
1. Article 5.2 states that “Community financing under this regulation shall take the form of 
grants”.  This is taken as the general use of the word “grants” to distinguish it from such 
mechanisms as loans or guarantees, and not the NFR specific use of grants to mean a payment 
to a non-profit entity.  This should be clarified.  (See also chapter three). 
 
2.      The difference between project evaluation (as covered by Articles 2.1(a), 11 and 13 of the 
Regulation) and strategic evaluation of the EC mine action mechanisms (as covered by Article 14 
of the Regulation) could perhaps be made clearer. (See chapter four for details). 
                                                 
2 The “Ottawa process” is the political process which led to the Mine Ban Treaty, which is now ratified.  
 
3 It is increasingly recognised that UXO cause more deaths and injuries world-wide than mines.  For 
example, see the recent British Medical Journal article by Bilukha and Brennan at 
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/330/7483/127 
 
4 Estimates suggest that Belgium still has over 100 million UXO from the first World War.  
 
5 UXO is ordnance which has been armed but has failed to detonate.  Unused munitions are not UXO. 
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3. The Regulation should be revised to reflect both current IMAS and the de facto situation 
whereby "humanitarian demining"  is defined as verifiable clearance of all ERW to a certain 
depth.  This should, inter alia, include clearance of abandoned munitions dumps, which may 
well contain neither mines nor UXO. 
 
4. Acknowledgement of the close links between mine action and Small Arms and Light 
Weapons limitation would probably strengthen the regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report was commissioned in compliance with Article 14 of Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 and 
Article 13 of Regulation (EC) 1725/2001.  The two regulations are collectively known as the Anti-
personnel Landmine Regulation6 (APLR).  These two articles mandate an overall assessment 
of all Community mine actions every three years, and call for suggestions for the future of the 
Regulation and proposals for amendments. 
Full background information about EC mine action is available in the documents “EC Mine 
Action 2002-2004”7 and “The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target”8 both of which 
can be downloaded from the EuropeAid website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid.  The 
background information will not be repeated in this report.  
This global assessment covers a great deal of ground from the political and strategic basis for 
action through to the actual implementation of projects in some of the poorest countries on 
earth. The body of the work is contained in four chapters based on (i) strategy, (ii) programming, 
(iii) project selection and contracting, and (iv) evaluation.  Recommendations are made at the 
end of each chapter.  A comprehensive set of annexes provides the interested reader with a 
substantial body of additional information and the reasoning behind the report.  The separation 
into chapters is somewhat artificial: it is well known that project management is a cycle and 
there are some strong interdependencies between these topics.  However, this layout, based on 
the Terms of Reference, allows for organisational clarity, and keeps the task manageable.  The 
evaluation team also presents in this report some new concepts which may assist in 
programming mine action projects, notably the Resiliance-Impact Matrix diagram.  
Since the approval of the Regulation in 2001 a great deal of progress has been made in 
humanitarian demining.  Political progress has led to the ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty with 
the vast majority of countries confirming their rejection of anti-personnel landmines.  
Contaminated land has been cleared so that people can grow food, refugees can return to their 
homes and children can play in safety.  Progress has also been made in establishing human-
itarian demining as a recognised and regulated discipline; the development of International Mine 
Action Standards covering many aspects of mine action is a notable achievement.  This report 
covers mine action from 2002 to 2004 and is, therefore, unable to take into full account the very 
recent developments of the reorganisation of EuropeAid nor all the changes taking place as 
Deconcentration moves new responsibilities to the EC Delegations world-wide. 
The European Community has been at the forefront of mine action from the beginning.  Over 
the years the commitment has not weakened or diminished and the EC with the EU Member 
States are, together, the largest donor to mine action.  Such a commitment brings with it the 
responsibility to ensure that the funding is used to the best advantage, and as efficiently as 
possible.  This report seeks to contribute to those aims. 
Much more still remains to be done however, and with this in mind the evaluation team offer 
their recommendations. 
The evaluation team would like to express their appreciation of the Terms of Reference: these 
were sufficiently broad that nothing important was excluded but also sufficiently focussed that 
results could be achieved in the time available.  The work would not have been possible without 
substantial help and cooperation from EC staff in Brussels and in the Delegations which were 
visited, and the staff of the other organisations and agencies who so freely gave their time.  
Throughout the evaluation difficult questions were answered without hesitation and access was 
never refused to information and documents.   
                                                 
6 Regulation 1724/2001 concerns mine action in developing countries and 1725/2001 mine action in third 
countries.  They are almost identical, so for ease of reference, this report will use the Article numbering of 
“Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001, concerning 
action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries”. 
7 http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/mine/intro/02_04en.pdf 
8 http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/mines/strategy_mip_2005_2007_en.pdf 
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The objective of this section of the report is to assess how well the program strategy documents map 




Assessment was done by document analysis, comparing the Multi-Annual Strategy document with the 
APL Regulation and analysing its functionality as a coordination instrument. 
 
Careful reading of the text of the APL Regulation allows the extraction of a series of criteria and tasks 
that are required (by Article 12 of the Regulation) to be covered by an APL Strategy Paper (in this 
case the document “EC Mine Action 2002-2004 Strategy and Multiannual Indicative Programming”).  
This strategy paper is referred to as the Multiannual Strategy (MAS) throughout this Report. 
 




The 2002-2004 MAS was published in four sections: the main text, plus three annexes, which cover: 
• Annex 1.  Applications of thematic priorities to geographic priorities 
• Annex 2.  Use of budget lines to support mine action 
• Annex 3.  Indicative focus countries for EC instruments in support of mine action, 2002-2004 
 
There are several positive aspects to the 2002-2004 MAS.  Its Annex 1 provides clear and transparent 
summaries of how funds have been allocated to national mine action programs; its Annex 2 provides 
a clear summary of the budget lines available to support mine action.  Indeed, in general, the text of 
the MAS and its annexes reflect the criteria set out in the text of the Regulation.  However, there also 
appear to be several weaknesses in the MAS in terms of its ability to map out a strategy for achieving 
the goals set out in the Regulation.  These are set out below. 
 
The first criticism that may be levelled at the strategy is that it provides little guidance for strategic 
prioritisation (as called for in Article 2.3 of the Regulation).  This is particularly significant given the wide 
number of eligible projects (such as those covered in Article 2.1) and the global reach of the 
Regulation.  The resultant risk is that EC resources will be spread thinly, over many short-term 
projects that attempt to provide “a little to all” without a coherent set of goals.  Project Cycle 
Management (PCM) is a technique already widely used by EuropeAid, and the evaluation team 
consider that use of the PCM Log Frame type of tool could provide a useful method at strategic level, 
as well as at a project level, to ensure that important considerations do not “fall through the gaps”.  An 
example layout is attached at Annex A. 
 
Given the nature of mine action projects, short term funding is unlikely to be the most efficient 
approach – many mine action projects are capital intensive and it is generally most efficient to fund 
projects over the useful life of one set of equipment – approximately five years.  It is possible to 
establish contracts that require annual validation (with the option to cancel funding in the event of 
                                                 
9 Regulation 1724/2001 concerns mine action in developing countries and 1725/2001 mine action in third 
countries.  Together they are known as the Antipersonnel Landmine regulation.  They are almost identical, 
so, for ease of reference, this report will use the Article numbering of “Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001, concerning action against anti-personnel landmines 
in developing countries”.  
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serious non compliance) and this is to be encouraged.  However, in order to be compliant with Article 
10.1 of the APLR in terms of cost-effectiveness it may mean that fewer, larger projects are supported.  
This would require Committee opinion in accordance with Article 9.2 for any project receiving over 
3M€.  This referral should be made whenever the nature of the project requires it. 10. 
 
Table 1-1 - Tasks set out in APL Regulation   
Ser  
(a)  
Requirement (b) Regulation 
Ref. (c) 
1 Aid should be linked to MBT compliance Para 7 
2 Aid should be integrated with development Para 8 
3 Research can be funded Para 9,11 
4 Stockpiles should be included Para 10 
5 Must be sure that actions have been effective Para 12 
6 Aid must be consistent with EC foreign policy Para 15 
7 Aid must be efficient, flexible and rapid Para 17 
8 Maximum transparency Para 19,20 
9 Supporting elaboration, monitoring and implementation Article 2.1.(a) 
10 Creating and sustaining international structures Article 2.1.(c) 
11 Aiming for maximum effectiveness Article 2.1.(c) 
12 Preventing casualties Article 2.1.(d) 
13 Assisting victim rehabilitation Article 2.1.(d) 
14 Supporting in country trials of appropriate equipment Article 2.1.(e) 
15 Supporting in country trials of appropriate techniques Article 2.1.(e) 
16 Coordinating equipment design with user requirements Article 2.1.(f) 
17 Encouraging clearance that is compatible with the environment Article 2.1.(g) 
18 Encouraging clearance that is compatible with sustainable development Article 2.1.(g) 
19 Supporting coordination Article 2.1.(h) 
20 Priority to be given to most seriously affected countries Article  2.3 
21 Mine action to be financed from relevant development budgets where possible Article 2.4 
22 Partners (to have appropriate expertise and experience) include regional and internationa
organizations, national provincial and local governments, institutes, public and private 
operators 
Article 4.1 
23 Participation to be equal between legal persons of member states and beneficiary country Article 4.2 
24 All tendering organizations to have adequate SOP and adequate insurance Article 4.3 
25 Where agreements exist, EC is not to cover taxes or duties Article 5.3 
26 Co-financing is possible Article 8.2 
27 Coordination and cooperation with international actors, UN, NGO and GICHD is promoted Article 8.3 
28 Projects to form part of wider development or reconstruction framework Article 10.1 
29 Projects to be prioritized and appraised in terms of positive impact and cost effectiveness Article 10.1 
30 Commission may carry out on the spot checks Article 11 
31 Commission to prepare strategy paper including: Article 12 
  horizontal guidelines   
  Priorities   
  Benchmarks   
32 The Commission to regularly assess operations funded by community Article 13 
33 The commission to report annually to European Parliament Article 14 
34 The commission to carry out overall assessment every 3 years and report to 
Parliament 
Article 15 
Table 1-1 Analysis of 2002-2004 MAS 
                                                 
10 The Team were informed that the main reason for choosing projects below 3M€ was the amount available 
per country given the yearly overall budget for the line, and not the need for referral. The need for this 
arbitrary restraint would disappear if a structured resource allocation mechanism (such as Multi-criteria 
Analysis as described in this Report) was adopted. 
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One useful technique that may be adopted for use in resource allocation is Multi-criteria Analysis 
(MCA).  The use of an MCA in this regard is discussed in detail in Annex B, which includes an 
example of how to undertake the task.   
 
Whilst the text of the 2002-2004 MAS repeats many of the criteria set out in the Regulation, it does not 
provide guidance as to how these are to be implemented or measured.  As a result, it has not fully 
complied with Article 12 (shown at line 31 in Table 1-1 above) in that there are no visible mechanisms 
for setting priorities or benchmarks for measurement of success.  For example: 
 
 Article 10.1 requires projects to be appraised in terms of positive impact and cost-effectiveness; 
the MAS does not provide any guidance as to how this is to be done 
 
 Whereas  MAS Annex 1 provides clear information on how much is to be allocated to various 
countries, and Annex 3 provides details of how these funds are to be allocated to projects, there is no 
visible ‘decision science’ on how these decisions were made.   
 
 Furthermore, the text provides no strategic benchmarks that allow measurement of 
performance; both prioritisation and benchmarking are a clear requirement of Article 12 of the 
Regulation and it would appear that the MAS is therefore not fully compliant with this requirement. 
 
This is not to say that these mechanisms do not exist: Part 1.2.1 of the main text of the MAS certainly 
suggests that they do: the problem is it is not possible to trace how these decisions were made.   
 
Finally, the MAS appears to confuse the different types of monitoring required by the Regulation.  
Paragraph 1.4 of the MAS describes the requirement of Article 13 to carry out a three-year review 
consisting of an overall assessment of all community mine actions, whereas Article 13 of the 
Regulation actually appears to require an assessment of the operations themselves, presumably 
through field monitoring and evaluation (which is also supported by several other sections of the 
Regulation, including Paragraphs 12, 19 and 20 of the Preamble and Article 2.1(a).  The subject of 
monitoring and evaluation is covered in more detail in Chapter four. 
 
In short, without clearer strategic guidance, prioritisation and benchmarking activities at a strategic 
level there is considerable risk that subsidiary activities, including programming, commitments and 




There are four major recommendations for future MAS documents.   
The Commission is recommended to develop the following tools as a matter of some urgency: 
 
• A strategic log frame for EC mine action.  An example is included at Annex A. 
 
• A check list of eligibility for implementing organisations and potential projects 
 
• A rigorous Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) mechanism to score proposals in line with the criteria 
set out in the Regulation. 
 
A process to make requests for strategic plans from EC delegations, with an emphasis on multi-year 
funding, coordinated cost-sharing with other donors in a sector-wide approach.  This will be covered 
again in the section on Programming in the next chapter. 
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This chapter assesses the process used to generate a programme for implementing the multi-
annual mine action strategy; derivation of the strategy was discussed in the previous chapter.  
The programme should, essentially, define what is to be done where, and this information can 
then be used to request proposals for projects or make calls for tenders to implement it.  The 




Assessment was made by document analysis, use of the EuropeAid project database, internet 
web searches, interviews with Commission staff, principally EuropeAid and Delegation 
personnel, and interviews with project implementers during field visits. 
Findings 
 
The use of Multi-Annual Programmes (MAPs) is welcomed by the evaluation team.  In preparing 
the MAP, European Commission staff are faced with a number of difficulties, two of which stand 
out: coordination and programming the allocation of resources. 
 
Coordination of the Programme 
 
The number and diversity of actors within the Commission and EU who are involved in mine 
action makes it difficult to move from a strategy to a coherent plan which everyone can agree, 
and which makes best use of available resources.  A range of different budget lines, types of 
project, delegations and Directorates General of the Commission are involved, in addition to 
donor and recipient countries.  This diversity also makes maintaining a record of all EC mine 
action extremely difficult (see Ex post coordination and Record Keeping below).   
 
A distinction should be made between the ex ante coordination needed to develop the 
programme and the ex post coordination and record keeping which enables tracking and 
evaluation of projects; both are important elements of the project cycle; feedback from projects 
is an essential input in planning.  
 
The majority of mine action funding does not pass through the mine action horizontal budget 
line, which for the period 2002-2004 totalled about 45 M€.  This was less than 40% of the total 
identified EC funding of 116 M€ in this period.  When contributions from all EU sources and 
Member States are also included the grand total rises to 410 M€, of which the horizontal mine 
action budget is just 11%.  Nonetheless, it is the small mine action team in Directorate General 
External Relations (RELEX) and the staff responsible for the mine action horizontal budget line 
who have the primary responsibility for coordination of all the different budget lines. 
 
The RELEX team have clearly put a great deal of effort into the ex ante programme 
coordination.  Bringing together all the different interests and achieving synergy between the 
disparate programmes is a major exercise which imposes a heavy load on the staff involved and 
the RELEX team does not appear to have been allocated sufficient resources for this. Achieving 
good coordination with administrators of many other programmes, some of whom have mine 
action as only a small part of their total budget, is acknowledged to be a major challenge.  
Deconcentration will have an impact on this; RELEX staff noted that there is considerable room 
for improvement in the information flow with delegations (see also footnote 12).  In addition, the 
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RELEX team has also to coordinate mine action at apolitical level with the European Parliament 
and other international bodies such as the Meetings of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention 
and has further responsibilities (e.g. Explosive Remnants of War, and Small Arms and Light 
Weapons policy).   
 
Under such circumstances it is inevitable that some aspects of the work will suffer.  One 
example is the lack of introduction of programming tools and methodologies – such as a 
formalized and independent coordination and resource allocation mechanism – which could in 
future materially assist in reducing this extreme workload as well as offering other important 
benefits.  RELEX emphasized, in their comments to the evaluation team, that they are well 
aware of the need for such a planning mechanism, but that they currently lack the resources to 
devote to this task.  Overall, the mine action staff appear to be too busy doing urgent work to do 
the important work which is necessary to achieve some longer term benefits.  The evaluation 
team consider that this problem can only be resolved by allocating more resources, at least in 
the short term, to make the breakthrough in establishing efficient and transparent strategic 
resource allocation mechanisms such as the Multi-Criteria Analysis referred to later in this 
chapter (below and in Annex B)." 
 
Programming – Resource Allocation 
 
There are far more needs in mine action than can be met with the funding available.  Spreading 
the resources too thinly can have the effect of reducing efficiency and increasing workload.  
Moreover, funding a large number of small actions also effectively eliminates the possibility of 
supporting the uptake of new technologies which may hold the key to significant improvements 
to clearance methods (APLR Article 2.1 e & f).  This is discussed further, below. 
 
What funding to allocate where for what purpose is a difficult problem and requires that hard 
decisions are made.  There is a clear need for measurable criteria and a transparent11 process 
(APLR introduction para 19 & 20, also principles of PCM, see chapter three).  Even though it 
yielded good results, the process used for 2002-2004 did not make clear what decisions were 
taken for which reasons – the programming must be seen to be objective and fair and not just 
have good outcomes.  Commission staff made informed judgements on the basis of multiple 
inputs including the Country Strategy Paper, information from Delegations, bilateral contacts 
with donors and recipients, political information and their own personal specialist knowledge.12  
Information overload, and choices which were based on non-comparable information and are 
hence open to challenge, are real risks of this way of working, especially given the need to 
always reject a large number of options due to funding limits.  This approach also imposes a 
great deal of pressure on staff.  The good results achieved with the 2002-4 programme reflect 
the hard work and personal commitment of the people involved, not a satisfactory process.   
 
Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA) is a potential solution which the evaluation team strongly 
recommends, see also chapter one and annex B.  The criteria and weightings for a mine action 
MCA should be decided at an inter-institutional level, with the participation all key constituents, 
to ensure cross-programme validity and broad acceptance.  The steps taken in this direction in 
the 2005-7 strategy paper are welcomed, but should be taken further to develop a full MCA.   
 
Further analytical tools, such as the Resilience-Impact Matrix (RIM) (see Annex B) should also 
                                                 
11 “Transparent” here takes its original meaning of visibility.  There is no suggestion whatsoever of improper 
action, merely that the actions taken to reach a certain outcome were not fully visible. 
12 The evaluation team heard statements that delegations did not feel adequately consulted in deciding the 
programme.  Equally, staff in Brussels expressed the view that they would welcome more input from 
delegations who did not always fully contribute to the process.  It was noted that these difficulties also extend 
to other programmes.   
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be used as appropriate to assist in the task of generating the multi-annual programme.  Greater 
use of this type of aids will assist the Commission in reducing dependence on difficult personal 
judgements in prioritization and allow greater synergy in programming mine action in countries 
with similar problems.  A full introduction to the RIM diagram and its application is given in annex 
B.  Briefly, it permits the grouping of countries as measured by two key criteria: (i) the Impact of 
mines/UXO and (ii) the country’s ability to cope, or “Resiliance”.  Each cluster of countries 
(which may be geographically distant) is associated with a range of suitable types of 
intervention.  Similarly, different areas of responsibility by different agencies within the EC can 
be allocated to different areas on the diagram, as can suitable “exit strategies” for longer term 
sustainability.  The most appropriate interventions for a particular RI ratio should be decided 
during programme development. 
 
Figure 2-1  Resilience-Impact Matrix (RIM) diagram.  See Annex B for full details.   
 
Ex post coordination and Record Keeping  
 
In terms of ex post  coordination, compiling a list of all mine action projects which have been 
undertaken from 2002 to 2004 throughout different parts of the EC (let alone Member State 
bilateral actions) has proved to be a difficult exercise and the need for improved data 
management is clear.  EuropeAid’s database is complete for their own projects, the indicative 
programme list held by RELEX includes most other EC mine action, but, for example, projects 
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mentioned in ECHO’s annual report had not been reported for inclusion in the listing of all 
projects13.   
 
Mine action also forms a small part of a number of different development projects in several 
countries.  Details of the financing allocated specifically for mine action within larger projects 
may only available from extensive searching of project files which are being moved to 
delegations as part of Deconcentration.  Tracking all these projects, which do not generally 
appear in database searches for “Mine Action,” will take a change to record keeping. 
 
The data that are available in Brussels are spread across a number of databases which are not 
linked.  Even EuropeAid and ECHO (both members of the “RELEX Family”) are not able to 
share this data easily.  Major funding sources include the European Development Fund, the 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism and several geographic budget lines.  Creating a method to 
exchange information is not straightforward and should be addressed in the first instance by 
examining the current systems and what can be achieved without major expense.  Coordinating 
information from the most important mine action budget lines should be accorded priority, 
perhaps starting with the members of the RELEX “family”.  This problem has clearly been 
recognised for some time as a pilot project was started by the JRC in 2002 to improve this 
record keeping14, but appears to have been abandoned as unsuccessful with no further data 
entered.   
 
Improvements in record keeping are necessary to benefit the programme planning process at a 
strategic level as well as to provide “who does what” information for internal Commission use 
and for the public.  Ultimately, the solution is not to spend considerable effort in preparing a 
comprehensive list of projects, but to invest the effort in better coordination which makes it 
easier to prepare the list. 
 
Creating greater coherence and cross-referencing between the various EC mine action 
websites should also be undertaken straight away (a search on Google locates a dozen, with a 
variety information and some have very few, if any, links to the other mine action web sites.  The 




• Survey  The large investment in Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) by the Commission is 
welcomed by the evaluation team – early support of LIS by the EC was found to have 
brought “on board” further donors and multiplied the benefits.  Accurate and detailed 
knowledge of the problem is the necessary first step in mine action, and in many cases the 
LIS significantly reduces the initial estimate of time and funding needed for clearance.  A 
major independent report on LIS is in publication (see Annex J) and the draft has been 
released to the team who support its findings. 
                                                 
13 The evaluation team undertook extensive searching of the EuropeAid database, and document searching for 
mine action projects funded from other budget lines.  The team also included with the questionnaire (see 
chapter 4 and annex E) a request to delegations to provide a list of all mine action projects in the period 2002-
2004.  Eight replies were received which fully demonstrated the difficulty of this type of record keeping.  
One delegation reported no projects even though the Brussels records indicated otherwise.  The other six 
countries reported projects funded from five different EC budget lines with about ten cost-sharing partners 
putting further funding into the projects.  There was some confusion about the reporting period: some 
projects of the 2000 or 2001 budget allocations did not start until 2002, some 2004 projects did not start until 
2005.  Analysing the responses from just eight delegations revealed that the RELEX indicative data had 
included all the major expenditure, but also emphasised that such a task would not be feasible worldwide 
within the Terms of Reference of the evaluation.  Not all the delegations with mine action projects had even 
responded to the questionnaire. 
 
14 http://eu-mine-actions.jrc.cec.eu.int/actions/contracts/index.htm 
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Of particular note in the LIS report is the strong criticism of donors who do not act on the 
priorities arising from the LIS and continue to fund mine action projects which are 
designated as low priority by the survey.  The authors go further in their remarks and state 
that donors often do not even read the LIS.   
 
As a major contributor to the substantial costs of LIS it is especially important that the EC 
takes the time to study survey results and furthermore, ensures that its programming, and 
hence the projects which receive funding, reflect the priorities suggested be the LIS.  If the 
costly LIS does not materially affect funding priorities there would seem to be little 
justification for it.  This is further discussed in the context of contracts in chapter three. 
  
• Exit Strategy  Many project descriptions include local capacity building, whether on a “train 
and equip” basis, in victim assistance, or by teaching skills from basic mine risk education to 
programme management.  The Regulation specifically mandates sustainability.  The overall 
programme, as well as individual projects, should have a viable exit strategy which ensures 
that, when project funding terminates, what is left is truly sustainable with local funds or with 
other identified and earmarked funds.  Mine clearance tasks should not be left part-
completed and large numbers of people should not be employed as deminers for one year 
only to be left unemployed again.   
 
Lack of a good exit strategy risks making the Commission hostage to bad publicity and ill 
feeling in addition to the potential negative impact on development and sustainability.  This 
implies that a greater emphasis should to be placed on continuity of action than during the 
2002 – 2004 Multiannual Strategy.  Longer duration projects, even if the cost per year has to 
be significantly reduced, should be seriously considered.  Instead of employing, for 
example, 100 deminers to clear land in one year then face unemployment, it may be better 
to support 35 deminers for three years by which time the local economy will have started to 
develop.  The exit strategy should also be reflected in the project design; this is discussed in 
chapter three.   
 
The RIM Diagram can be used to provide some guidance as to how the exit strategy will 
vary with the nature of the program.  For example, in a “high impact, high resilience” country 
the exit strategy will of necessity tie in with the type of support being given by training.  In 
comparison “high impact, low resilience” situations require the most careful planning of exit 
strategy.  It is unlikely that the donor community will pay for the entire clearance of the whole 
country, victim assistance, etc, so it is important to determine which areas of highest priority 
will be funded first by external donors. 
 
Furthermore, where national funding is to pay ongoing costs the EC should in future 
ascertain that the project cost is feasible and that the political will exists in the country to 
support the work.  This was not always the case in projects examined by the team.   
 
• International Standards  When the APLR was written mine action was a comparatively new 
concept.  There is now an established body of good practice and successful projects which 
planners can draw on.  The UN supported International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) now 
cover many aspects of planning and implementing mine action and are the de facto 
standards.  The team found that the EC has good understanding of the use of standards 
and need for compliance with IMAS. 
 
• Introducing new methods and technologies  Annex C provides an overview of mine action 
technology research and development which has been funded or co-funded by the EC.  The 
APLR mandates support for the introduction of new technologies and for improving 
efficiency but the team noted that little was achieved in this area in 2002-2004.  There is a 
clear cost to introducing technology and new techniques in the field, as the APLR 
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recognizes, but the potential mid and long term benefits are considerable and could far 
outweigh the costs.  Mine action organizations active in the field have no incentive to 
improve efficiency unless donors not only request but insist on, changes15, and are prepared 
to fund the initial additional costs (which may include the through life costs of operating the 
equipment).  Demining is, for a number of reasons, a generally conservative activity where 
any change must be justified and there is always pressure not to change proven but 
inefficient methods which are now outdated. 
 
What is urgently needed is not just new equipment but also greater support for getting more 
equipment with an already proven utility (e.g. brush cutters) into the field.  The greatest 
impact will be achieved by changes to  contract methodologies which permit organizations 
to fully benefit from the expenditure on capital investment in technology, irrespective of 
whether they are a commercial company seeking to amortize an investment or an NGO 
seeking to make best long-term use of donor funds (see also chapter three).  Piecemeal 
support to technology developers and testers is not likely to have any greater impact in the 
future than in the past, and to date has not proved effective.  The development of standards 
is, in itself, important but cannot influence technology take-up in the way that changes to 
programming and contracts can.  A pro-active attitude could transform the EC into a world-
leader in this area and potentially lead to substantial cost savings in the future. 
 
• Victim Assistance  Medical support to mine victims is a particularly difficult issue.  In mine 
affected countries which substantially lack health care facilities, the evaluation team 
consider that it is clearly beyond the scope of mine action programmes to put in place an 
entire public health care system.  Medical ethics suggest that emergency facilities cannot be 
exclusively reserved for mine victims and closed to others needing similar trauma care.  
Thus the overwhelming majority of those assisted may well not be mine victims: road traffic 
accident victims typically outnumber mine victims by far more than ten to one16.  Criteria of 
sustainability, the need for a viable exit strategy and “added value” criteria should be 
carefully applied to such medical support.  The risk of not being able to withdraw from 
medical support projects without adverse publicity should also be carefully addressed at 
programme level.  Medical assistance to mine victims is possibly best addressed by 
supporting the mainstreaming of mine action. 
 
• Support for the MBT and campaigns  The European Institutions have been at the forefront 
of the success of the Ottawa process and subsequent successes in campaigning for 
support and ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).  A considerable part of this success is 
due the efforts and personal dedication of the small team responsible.  The European 
Institutions derive real value from visibility of these policies.  The evaluation team considers 
that national support for the MBT is a relevant criterion in the MCA for programme 
generation.  However, given the considerable success of the MBT and associated 
campaigns so far it may be time to review the funding allocated to support of such 




Multi Criteria Analysis should be introduced as soon as possible to ensure a transparent and 
objective process in programming and reduce workload.  Other tools, such as the RIM diagram, 
                                                 
15 As has been noted in the working group on Mine Action Technologies at the Intersessional meetings of the 
Ottawa process, donors have a clear responsibility in improving efficiency by insisting on such improvement 
and by supporting the initial costs of implementation of improved technologies.  See 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/7.3/focus/acheroy/acheroy.htm 
 
16 Accident data from Mozambique for 1980 to 1993 show that, in a country at the time heavily contaminated 
by mines and with little traffic, 35% of accidental deaths were due to road accidents, but only 3% to mines. 
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may also be helpful and are strongly recommended.  The evaluation team recommends  that 
sufficient resources should be made available to RELEX and/or EuropeAid for speedy 
implementation of such programming mechanisms in order to realize significant immediate and 
longer term benefits. 
 
Greater priority should be give to the coordination of information on the wide range of mine 
action activities within the EC.  This may require reallocation of some financial and human 
resources away from project implementation.  Improved data management, to allow better 
global reporting and hence complementarity, should be included in this coordination.  The 
deconcentration process should, as far as possible, be used to reduce Brussels project 
management activities in order to release staff time for this.  
 
The programme should continue to reflect Landmine Impact Survey  (LIS) priorities and support 
further LIS where appropriate.  Programming should strenuously avoid making funds available 
for purposes deemed to be low priority by a LIS. 
 
Land clearance and, in particular, some types of medical victim assistance are very costly and 
present large demands on limited resources.  Better value will probably be obtained by 
supporting “high added value” activities from the relatively small horizontal budget line, such as 
coordinating different donors and budgets to effectively jointly fund high-cost interventions. 
 
Support for new techniques and technologies should be reviewed and substantially improved.  
This will be primarily by changes to the programming and contracts by supporting fewer, larger, 
and especially longer, projects (not necessarily from the horizontal budget line).  The EC must 
be prepared to invest in the (sometimes substantial) increased initial cost of more efficient 
techniques in order to reap the mid- and long-term benefits and to give a global lead.   
 
 The “exit strategy” needs to be considered at programme level as well as project level so that 
sustainability criteria are fully met, best use is made of resources, and the visibility of the EC is 
improved.  This is particularly important in medical support to mine victims.   
 
The EC is recommended to continue and extend its use of, and support for, International Mine 
Action Standards. 
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Once the strategy and the programme have been decided, suitable projects must be identified 
and funded, and their outcomes evaluated.  This chapter examines the contractual and project 





Assessment was made by document analysis, internet web searches, interviews with 
Commission staff, principally EuropeAid and Delegation personnel, and interviews with project 







Project Cycle Management.  EuropeAid has considerable experience of the use of Project 
Cycle Management (PCM) tools to ensure efficient and successful management.  The role of 
PCM is clearly outlined on the EuropeAid website17: 
 
"For all Commission operations the [Project Management] cycle highlights three common principles: 
-i- Decision making criteria and procedures are defined at each phase (including key information 
requirements and quality assessment criteria); 
-ii- The phases in a cycle are progressive – each phase should be completed for the next to be tackled 
with success; and  
-iii- New programming and project identification draws on the results of monitoring and evaluation as part 
of a structured process of feedback and institutional learning." 
 
The chapters on strategy and programming have already discussed the need for objective 
criteria to be used in a transparent process (principle -i- in the PCM list above) and the need for 
improved data management to support feedback and institutional learning (principle -iii-).  The 
final chapter will discuss evaluation in greater detail (principle -iii-). 
 
Basing the selection of projects on the output of a completed Multicriteria Analysis (MCA) – or a 
similar objective and transparent process– and avoiding ad hoc proposals is clearly required by 
the second principle of PCM listed above. 
 
Outcome and output focus, not activity focus. 
 
Mine action projects have at times been too activity focussed instead of output focussed; 
measures of activity, such as an increase in the number of mine clearance teams or MRE staff 
have been used in proposals instead of measures of output.  Measures of output could be the 
amount of land cleared or number of MRE sessions undertaken.  Better yet, as is clear when 
using PCM techniques, is to measure outcome.  For example, the stated aim of a project might 
be to clear a certain amount of land or conduct MRE for a certain number of people.  These are 
measures of output and not outcomes.  The overall goal of the first intervention might be to 
resettle refugees and an outcome criterion would typically be the successful resettlement.  
                                                 
17 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/qsm/project_en.htm  
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Similarly, the end goal of MRE is to change high-risk behaviour and not simply to make contact 
with large numbers of people, so behaviour change is the outcome.  The evaluation team 
recommend that this is given greater emphasis during proposal selection and contracting.  PCM 
methodology has been required of the implementing agencies for the management of the mine 
action projects (for example through the Logical Framework in which both outcome and output 
are specified in terms of concrete results and activities). However the team consider that its 
systematic application at a strategic level could yield further benefits, in particular at the start and 
finish of the cycle – i.e. identification of needs by stakeholders and project evaluation.  The 
survey process and IMAS evaluation standards (see chapter 4) can contribute to this.18 
 
Broadening the participation base 
 
Need for increased response  In the period 2002-2004 there were only two calls for proposals 
using the APL budget line and the rest of the funds were dispersed as direct grants without a 
call. 
   
Furthermore, EuropeAid staff commented on the difficulty in getting an adequate response to 
some calls for proposals, and how there tends to be only a limited sub-set of organizations 
prepared to submit proposals. 
 
Mine action has relatively few actors globally so it is essential to be as inclusive as possible in 
getting responses in order to reduce the number of contracts issued to a single proposer without 
competition.  The evaluation team consider that reduced competition has at times led to 
increased pricing, especially for clearance work which is a high cost item19. There is no 
suggestion of malpractice here, just a lack of incentive to be efficient and innovative when there 
is no competition.  The team is therefore firmly of the view that increased competition resulting 
from more proposals could bring about significant reductions in cost for the EC without any loss 
of quality20.   
 
There are, however, also some “natural monopolies” in mine action which should be respected 
and not subjected to competition.  National Mine Action Authorities are a clear example – 
support for NMAAs should include criteria that encourage efficiency, but setting up a second 
NMAA “in competition” would not be the way to do this. 
 
Tenders and commercial companies  Both the New Financial Regulation (NFR) and the 
standard contracts used by EuropeAid favour contracting with NGOs, and other non-profit 
organizations, over tendering by commercial operators.  However, the APLR states in article 4: 
“1.  Partners eligible for financial support under this regulation may include […] private operators 
with appropriate specialised expertise and experience.”  (Article 5.2 states that “Community 
financing under this regulation shall take the form of grants”.  This is taken as the general use of 
the word “grants” to distinguish it from such mechanisms as loans or guarantees, and not the 
NFR specific use of grants to mean a payment to a non-profit entity.  A change to the APLR 
would be helpful in clarifying this point). 
 
Some use has been made of commercial companies as subcontractors – there is apparently no 
objection to a non-profit organisation such as the UNDP presenting a project proposal where a 
large part of the work is sub-contracted to commercial partners.  This flexibility is very much 
                                                 
18 PCM and Log Frames are actually separate techniques, EuropeAid has been a pioneer of their merged use, 
see http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/ qsm/documents/pcm_manual_2004_en.pdf 
19 The issue of competition was discussed in depth in the evaluation of the mine action sector in Cambodia 
coordinated by UNDP in November-December 2004, whose findings strongly support this view. The 
evaluation team regard these findings as generally applicable in principle throughout mine action 
20 The GICHD study on Manual Demining (due for publication later in 2005) also strongly supports this view 
that price sensitivity is the key to getting value for clearance operations.   
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welcomed by the evaluation team.   
 
It is strongly recommended that ways are sought to immediately increase participation by both 
NGOs (see “Documentation” below), and also private operators, where their specialist skills are 
required, and in particular where there are few or no NGOs operating in country, – the NFR 
includes the use of tendering with private companies.  The tendering process can involve both 
more time and more effort than grants, but should be used where real added value can be 
obtained from working with commercial organisations as well as non-profit ones, even if grants 
are considered the norm. 
 
The NFR use of calls for proposals for non-profit entities and tenders for all types of 
organisations, including commercial companies, obscures a possibly useful difference between 
these instruments.  A call for proposals generally sets objectives and leaves to the proposer the 
description of how the objectives are to be achieved and at what cost.  A tender typically 
describes the work which is to be done and requests a price from bidders.  Tenders may offer 
greater control of the process and this may be important for two reasons: 
 
• They may permit greater insistence that work is prioritised in accordance with the findings of 
an LIS where one has been done.  There is a recognised problem that some international 
organisations develop significant expertise in one approach to mine action and are then 
reluctant to tackle objectives in any other way, even when LIS recommendations call for it 
(see also Annex J).  
• They can be used to assist in the specification of outcome defined contracts instead of 
activity defined contracts (see above)  
 
In the period of this assessment there was only one such open tender.  Greater use of the 
tendering process with bids requested from all qualified actors should be seriously considered 
as it can be used to  resolve these three issues: to ensure compliance with LIS priorities, to 
promote contracts based on defined outcomes and to include the greatest number of potential 
proposers as eligible. 
  
The geographic restrictions which limit participation to NGOs from either the affected country or 
EU member states can have unexpected and negative consequences in mine action.  The 
security situation in mine/UXO affected countries can be fragile and organisations in the field 
may choose to locate their offices and support infrastructure in adjacent countries, for example 
some agencies operating in southern Sudan are based in Kenya and thus ineligible for grant 
support from the Commission.  Attention should be given to examining this restriction and 
potential derogation mechanisms. 
 
Documentation  The evaluation team found that project proposers and contract tenderers 
generally do not fully understand the rationale behind Commission’s project documentation and 
this contributes to the lack of interest by some of them; filling in the forms without knowing why 
certain data are required can be difficult and frustrating.  Some effort is already made by 
delegations to inform proposers and a number of guides and explanatory documents are 
available on Commission websites.  Despite this, Brussels staff reported that up to 80% of 
proposals are rejected on technicalities such as failure to sign the correct form.  This is a “lose-
lose” situation which should be addressed immediately.  The Commission is apparently not 
getting enough good quality bids for mine action projects and yet has to reject potentially useful 
proposals, meanwhile the implementers become resentful that the substantial effort needed to 
write a proposal is wasted for seemingly trivial reasons21.   
 
                                                 
21 If a good proposal fails on a technicality a poorer but adequate proposal may, of course, be awarded the 
contract.  This unduly favours organizations with strong proposal presentation skills over those with project 
implementation skills who are not so adept at the paperwork. 
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Clearly, this is not just a mine action problem, but the lack of good proposals in some countries 
makes it acutely felt in mine action.  A step by step guide (e.g.  a vade mecum) and 
considerably more effort in working with proposers appear to be needed.  A first step might be to 
seek to make the various guides already available better known and easier to find by collecting 
them in one place and publicising them, but re-writing in a more approachable format may also 
be necessary. 
 
Proposal Assessment  
 
Once valid proposals have been received they need be assessed on the basis of a dual 
knowledge set (a “binome”) which looks at the proposed actions from two distinct and 
complementary points of view.  Evaluation or assessment should consider the following: 
 
• Projects should be assessed in the light of strategy, programming, established practice of 
the relevant Commission services, political considerations, financial and contractual norms 
and development practice.  EuropeAid and the Delegations have considerable expertise 
and experience in most of these issues – this is where the European Commission has 
considerable strength.  The introduction of the NFR and Deconcentration clearly present 
some challenges, but also some opportunities. 
 
• In parallel, an assessment needs to be made from an authoritative technical point of view by 
evaluators whose level of technical expertise is respected by the national and international 
organisations presenting the proposals or bids.  This “expert peer evaluation” is established 
practice, for example, in the research Directorates General of the Commission. 
 
In development sectors with large budgets and many projects, such as agricultural or 
infrastructure development, a delegation might be expected to have suitable technical expertise 
available from staff members.  However, mine action is such a small sector that this expertise is, 
almost without exception, not available.  The response appears to have been to trust that 
proposers are indeed fully knowledgeable and are offering maximum value and efficiency 
without further technical checking.  This is a very high risk strategy which cannot be 
recommended. 
 
A further point regarding assessment is the inclusion of further criteria from the APLR: given the 
APLR's mandate, a strong case can also be made for the evaluation criteria for all project 
proposals to also include efficiency (e.g. rigorous cost-benefit analysis) and also other aspects 
such as support for technology.  In both cases the assessors should, clearly, have the 
necessary qualifications and experience to complement the strategic and development 
orientation of EuropeAid staff.    
 
In all of the countries where field visits were made the potential consequences of a lack of 
rigorous and authoritative technical appraisal could be noted, and the consequent risks to the 
Commission.  At times it was only thanks to the diligence of EuropeAid and project staff that 
good results had been achieved.  For example, in Azerbaijan the national mine action authority, 
a partner in the LIS, was able to identify savings of 0,3 M€ in an already awarded contract of 1,6 
M€ and was subsequently able to renegotiate part of the contract.  There is no suggestion of 
any financial wrongdoing in this, however the lack of technical appraisal by suitably qualified 
staff led to initial acceptance of a contract where significant gains in efficiency could have been 
made.  The mechanisms for this technical evaluation already exist in the NFR22 and in the 
Framework Contracts to support delegations.  Increased use of technical evaluation is 
                                                 
22 Article 178 Evaluation of applications. 
“1.  The authorising officer responsible shall appoint a committee to evaluate the proposals, […]  
[…]Outside experts may assist the committee by decision of the authorising officer responsible.”  
 
Global assessment of EC mine policy and actions: 2002-2004.  Final report. March 2005 
 
Chapter  3: PROJECT SELECTION AND CONTRACTING  Page 16  
necessary to reduce the risk presented to the Commission by both poor quality and also 
deliberately misleading proposals.   
 
One of the key challenges of Deconcentration is this fragmentation of key technical skills and 
the perception of the reduced authority of local – as compared with Brussels-based – staff when 
proposals from respected organizations need to be challenged on detailed technical grounds. 
 
Transfer of sufficient resources by Brussels from other budget items to administrative costs to 
fully support delegations and EuropeAid staff in this technical assessment task, even if done at 
the expense of some project implementation, is very strongly recommended.  The evaluation 
team are convinced that the potential benefits far outweigh the costs and that an increase in 
project quality and efficiency can fully justify the relatively small extra expenditure. 
 
The evaluation team notes that the poor security situation in some mine-affected countries 
imposes constraints by requiring significant contingency provision that could appear to be 
excessive to anyone unfamiliar with the local circumstances (see the country report on Somalia 
introduced in Chapter 4 for an example).  This could tend to penalise good proposals which 
allow sufficient money for likely emergencies and accidents, and thus appear to be overpriced.  
The Commission should insist that proposers adequately focus on risk analysis and 
management for projects in countries where the security situation and infrastructure are poor.  
The evaluation team noted that a number of projects had failed to finish in Somalia due to lack 
of contingency planning, and that in one case the resulting partly trained EOD staff may not be a 
useful asset.  The general ending of a contingency provision in the budget may exacerbate this, 
however there is continued permission for international organisations to allow contingency funds 
and this should be encouraged as appropriate. 
 
 
The contractual chain - Clarity and accountability of contractual obligations 
 
A further area where improvements could be made is in more closely defining the precise 
contractual chain of responsibility: this was found to be unclear in many of the projects visited 
(this was raised as a specific issue during the visit to Azerbaijan, which is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4).  Some project implementers (including UNDP in one country23) complained 
of having “all the responsibility but no authority” when it came to subcontracted work.  An 
example is one of the LIS contracts where there appeared to be little clarity as to who was 
ultimately responsible to whom in the extended chain of command.24  The Commission did not 
appear to be in receipt of the Quality Assurance reports provided as part of one LIS, indeed it 
appears that the LIS chain of command effectively did not include the donor.  This is far from 
satisfactory.  Clear contractual obligations must be consistently enforced to create a culture of 
best practice. 
 
In general, implementers felt that the Commission was not always getting good value on 
contract implementation largely due to not insisting on getting good value and “flexing its 
muscles” to ensure that the contractual obligations were adequately fulfilled.  One important 
aspect is that the Commission appears to undervalue the role of its implementing agents who 
are paid up to 7% of contract value25 but not then fully used. 
                                                 
23 The UNDP is a large organisation which varies from country to country.  Other organisations raised points 
regarding the real value that UNDP adds to contracts in some countries.  Use of the UNDP as an example 
does NOT mean that other international organisations might not be suitable.  The EC must ensure when 
contracting an agent that obtains the best possible value. 
24 The contractual chain for the LIS in Azerbaijan involved seven layers:  
European Commission, UNOPS, UNMAS, Survey Action Center, Survey Working Group, National Mine 
Action Agency, local NGO. 
25 If each organisation in a long contractual chain takes a percentage for administration then the total amount 
can be far in excess of the nominal 7% limit. 
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The contractual situation is at times made worse by unclear and ambiguous statements in the 
“Description of the Project” (Annex 2 of the contract)26.  The Commission clearly needs to further 
empower itself to act to raise standards and to take a more strategic approach to getting the 
contract right and thus saving time and effort later in project management.   
 
Using international organisations (e.g. UNDP) which are already active in country, in the role of 
agents potentially offers a number of advantages, particularly when they are able to act for 
several funders and several projects.  This can reduce transaction costs and create synergies, 
as well as provide local knowledge.  This is of particular value in countries with no delegation.  
However the EC must ensure, when contracting and using an agent, that it obtains the best 
value possible.  Articles 8.2, 8.3 and 10.2of the APLR encourage this integrated approach.  
Figure 3-1 shows one possible structure. 
 
The slow speed of receipt of payments is a separate issue which was raised, however the 
evaluation team note that the NFR mandates payment in 45 calendar days. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: The role of an “Agent” organisation  
 
 
Local sustainability and continuity 
 
Projects which will lead to locally sustainable activities must be of a size which is commensurate 
with local resources; similarly, cost-shared projects must remain at a feasible size for all funding 
partners.  There can be a temptation to add more parts to a proposal as there is always more 
useful work that can be done.  The team noted in two of the countries visited that the net result 
was projects which had ended up being beyond what realistic estimates of local resources could 
sustain and cutbacks were necessary.  Care is needed to achieve the balance between 
ambition and realism, and greater rigour and realism is probably needed in assessing potential 
                                                 
26 A typical example is the following: An annex 2 stated that an organisation has the responsibility that it 
"will assist with provision of advisors".  Is this a responsibility to assist the project by providing advisors, or 
will someone else provide the advisors but this organisation will assist with their recruitment, or perhaps 
assume part or all of the cost of the advisors.  At least three different interpretations are open to this phrase, 
and the context does not suggest which is correct.   
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local capacities.  Clearly, where local skills and funding are available they should be fully used.  
Deconcentration should assist in providing expert local knowledge in this area. 
 
Some specialist skills like EOD are not always best approached as a one-off training exercise.  
Refresher courses and internationally recognized accreditation may require very much longer 
involvement with, for example, annual short courses and skills evaluations for several years.  
There appears to be little recognition of this in mine action projects.  The potential 
consequences of an error can be very serious and a general move to longer (but not 
necessarily larger) projects should be seriously considered in designing contractual frameworks. 
 
Finally, discussions with RELEX and EuropeAid staff make it clear that after Deconcentration 
many decisions will still be taken at Brussels.  The New Financial Regulation, NFR, also defines  
who can be authorised to make certain decisions.  Even given these limitations, 
Deconcentration still allows Delegations to undertake some more of the day-to-day project 
management tasks, as well as to have a greater role in the initiation and contracting of some 
projects, and evaluation and assessment.  The evaluation team consider that this increased role 
offers an opportunity for the staff in Brussels to focus more than at present on the strategic and 
programming issues which this report has highlighted as some of the areas of concern.  Given 
the very small Commission team in charge of mine action in Brussels, and their substantial 
workload, every opportunity offered by Deconcentration and the NFR to involve the delegations 




Project Cycle Management, a technique already widely used by EuropeAid, should be applied 
to all mine action, as far as the diversity of budget lines permits.  EuropeAid staff should take the 
lead in this and ensure the full cycle of PCM as well as Log Frame methods are used.  
 
Broadening the proposal base and reducing the percentage of bids rejected on technicalities 
are both necessary as a matter of urgency.  This should promote increased competition which 
can be expected to give better value, especially in clearance activities, which are very costly.  
Further use of commercial operators (in accordance with the APLR) should be included.  
However, support to “natural monopolies” such as NMAAs should be continued.  Improving the 
understanding by proposers of the Commission documentation is a first step to very significantly 
reducing the number of rejected proposals.  A vade mecum or similar guide (on paper or 
website) should be considered. 
 
Technical project assessment should be considerably strengthened to reduce the risk taken by 
the Commission and to improve quality and strategic value.  A dual knowledge base (binome) 
approach to project assessment should become the standard, using mechanisms which are 
already available.  This is especially important in view of the fragmentation effect of 
Deconcentration.  Funding for this should be made available as a priority, even at the expense 
of some project implementation. 
 
Project proposers and assessors should be encouraged to use criteria which focus on the true 
outcomes or outputs of a project and not on its activity.  The use of tendering (as opposed to 
proposals) by non-profit entities may be useful in this regard.  Efficiency should become a 
standard criterion in proposals in order to comply with the Regulation, a suitable approach would 
be a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Greater contractual rigour is needed to make sure that responsibility and authority are 
commensurate, are clearly stated in the project documents, and are enforced in practice.  Put 
bluntly, the Commission must learn to insist on better value for money and make better use of 
the services of agents where these are used as intermediaries. 
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Projects with long-term local participation must be of a size and type that is feasible for local 
governments and organizations to continue.  The need for longer term refresher training and 
repeat accreditation should be considered in allocating funding. 
 
Project management and the contracting process should, as far as possible, be devolved to the 
Delegations in line with the principle of Deconcentration wherever the requirements of the NFR 
allow it. 
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The objective of this element of the report is to assess how well the current structures have 
allowed the evaluation of EC funded projects, in line with Article 2.1(a), Article 11 and Article 13 





In tackling this question, the evaluation team considered how the structures have worked, how 
evaluation of mine action has developed in the years since the publication of the Regulation, 
recommendations for possible improvements and, where resources allowed, assessment of a 
sample of projects in different geographical areas funded by different EC budget lines. 
 
The Team have taken a number of approaches in assessing this issue. These include: 
 
 
• Literature review of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) which is included in full at 
Annex D with its findings summarised below 
 
 
• Literature review of the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) Study report “Producing Better 
Evaluation of EC Funded Mine Action Projects,”  2002,27 the findings are summarised below 
 
 
• Development of a proposed generic Terms of Reference (TOR) for future EC project 
evaluations which is included in Annex D. This is designed to facilitate the conduct of future 
project evaluations on behalf of the EC in light of current shortfalls in established mine action 
evaluation methodology as described here 
 
 
• Circulation of a questionnaire to all 21 EC Delegations known to have an EC-funded mine 
action project in their coverage area (as identified by a document search in EC offices by the 
evaluation team in December 2004). This is considered a representative sample. The 
questionnaire solicited opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of EC mechanisms; the 
results are compiled at Annex E, and are summarised below. The responses were kept 
confidential as agreed in the initial mission briefing as set out in the Inception Report. 
 
 
• Circulation of a questionnaire for project implementing organisations. This questionnaire 
repeated the process set out above but was optimised for responses from implementing 
organisations or relevant international organisations such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The results are 
compiled at Annex F with the findings summarised below. 
 
 
• Field missions were also carried out in order to test the proposed Evaluation TOR and to gain 
first-hand feedback from actual projects in accordance with Article 13 of the Regulation. These 
missions were carried out to: (i) Somalia, (ii) Azerbaijan, and (iii) Bosnia & Herzegovina and 







                                                 
27 Available from http://eu-mine-actions.jrc.cec.eu.int/ performance/final/studyfinal.pdf 
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Evaluation is the main way in which feedback is obtained on the way an activity has been 
conducted and is therefore a key part of any strategy.  It is explicitly required for PCM.  However, 
in the past, mine action has not been particularly good at including evaluation as a core activity 
in its processes.  This is particularly the case for mine clearance which has often been seen as 
being linear, ending when mines are removed and land handed over (much the same as when a 
construction project comes to an end), rather than as part of an iterative process within the 
standard ‘project cycle’ commonly used in development work.  That there are always more 
mines to be cleared suggests that clearance should be considered as part of a development 
process – answering questions like “where should we clear next year?” – and is therefore 
suitable for consideration using the full project cycle, including evaluation. 
 
In many respects the EC, particularly with respect to Article 14 of the Regulation, was an early 
adopter of the need for strategic evaluation of mine action with the commissioning of the JRC 
Study in 2001.  This three-year global assessment report is a further part of the evaluation 
process. However, events have moved on and there has been an increasing interest in 
evaluation by donors.  International standards have also been developed and IMAS now include 
monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs, with clear requirements for donors.  
 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
 
The evaluation team have reviewed IMAS at length, especially those IMAS that are specifically 
concerned with project evaluation.  The team consider that, in general, IMAS have developed 
sufficiently over the period covered by this Report to now form the basis for evaluation of mine 
action programs and projects.  A detailed assessment of the relevant IMAS is included at Annex 
D to this Report.  
 
“Study Report Producing Better Evaluation of EC Funded Mine Action Projects,”  JRC 200228 
 
Since its publication in 2002, some of the concepts of the JRC report have subsequently been 
set out in more detail in other fora, such as the newer IMAS on contracts being prepared by 
GICHD (e.g. IMAS 07.20). There is also, as mentioned above, a new IMAS on project 
evaluation. The JRC Study Report should therefore be regarded as having been overtaken by 
events and the evaluation team recommend that it should not be further used or developed. 
 
The JRC report contains many accurate observations but does not fully address the essential 
task of providing guidelines and a methodology for project evaluation. Most of the main text and 
the first two annexes are focussed on how to design a mine action project and a contract, 
instead of how to evaluate a project. The report explains at considerable length the problem with 
the scope of the original terms of reference though little seems to have been done to limit the 
scope to fit the resources and meet the aim of the title (i.e. “producing better evaluation”). The 
report’s Annexes C and D are intended to provide guidance on quantitative data for the 
measurement of output and of performance indicators, though in practice much of the content of 
these Annexes is rather superficial. The Report also makes assumptions about the role of the 




The Team is grateful to all of the Delegations and implementing organisations that took the time 
to complete and return the questionnaires. The key findings of the questionnaires are set out 
below: 
                                                 
28 Available from http://eu-mine-actions.jrc.cec.eu.int/ performance/final/studyfinal.pdf 
29 In particular, the Study Report includes diagrams that seem to show JRC with an operational role in 
making decisions about mine action projects and proposes the “JRC as the nominated focal point, not only 
for EU mine action data, but also regionally and internationally.” 
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• Delegation questionnaires.   Eight Delegations returned completed questionnaires (which 
were collected with a guarantee of anonymity).  Full details are included at Annex E.  The 
key findings are: 
 
o Not all Delegations appear to be aware that RELEX has sent them copies of the EC 
Regulation or Multi-Annual Strategy.  Those that have these documents are of mixed 
opinions about their usefulness – ranging from “very useful” to “no apparent use”. 
 
o A number of project successes were reported, which suggests that, in general, EC 
contributions are being used well and that the various problems described in this Report 
can be overcome. 
 
o There are a number of problems with projects, mainly concerning risk issues that were 
not taken into account of during the project design. The issue of risk management is 
described elsewhere in this Report but, in short, it appears that more careful risk analysis 
could be of significant help at the project design stage. 
 
o One delegation reports that the situation is exacerbated by a lack of communication, and 
confusion, about the relative roles of Brussels and Delegations. This is supported by the 
findings of the Team during the visits reported below. 
 
• Implementer questionnaires.   Ten implementing agencies returned completed 
questionnaires. The replies (which were collected under a guarantee of anonymity) are from 
a mix of organisations (including mine action authorities, international organisations and 
mine action NGOs). Whilst there may be some subjectivity in the responses there is 
nevertheless also interesting consistency to some of the answers. Full details are included 
at Annex F.  The key findings are: 
 
o All respondents complain about the delays involved in the project process; one makes 
the point that delays in the process are exacerbated by the retention of large parts of the 
payment until the end of the project. It is hoped that Deconcentration will go some way to 
removing some of these problems. 
 
o There is some divergence in the attitude to the processes involved; it seems that the 
complexity of the Commission’s paperwork  favours the established implementers who 
are familiar with the forms – the situation is exacerbated for those organisations who do 
not have access to good or native English speakers.  
 
o There is some level of complaint about the assessment and selection processes. The 
evaluation team consider that this could be largely solved by more objective and 
transparent resource allocation and selection processes described in other parts of this 
report. 
 
o Finally, there is a sense from all of the responses that the EC processes are somehow 
‘out of touch’ with the real situation. Again, allowing for any subjectivity, Deconcentration 





The visits provided the Team with an opportunity to validate the findings from the literature 
review and the questionnaires, and proved to be very useful in this regard. In all cases, the visits 
would not have been possible without the aid of the EC Delegations/Representative Offices 
involved and the cooperation of the local mine action community and UNDP mine action teams. 
The key findings were: 
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• Delegations did not appear to fully understand how resources were allocated between 
different countries and projects by Brussels. However, it was unanimously felt that 
Deconcentration is an importnat tool in allowing improvement of project selection and 
monitoring.  There is further work to be done in making the full use of the Deconcentration 
process, which has the potential allow the relevant officials in Brussels to concentrate on the 
continued development of strategic and higher-level programming issues, as set out in the 
rest of this report, without being overloaded with detail project work.  This is of course 
subject to any constraints imposed by the NFR. 
 
• Delegations have more responsibility as a result of Deconcentration – however UNDP and 
other relevant organisations, such as the International Trust Fund have the ability to act as 
Agents on behalf of donors; a synergistic relationship with other donors and a coordination 
Agent should allow the most cost-effective management of donor–implementer 
relationships. 
 
• A significant proportion of EC funds for mine action have been spent on the conduct of 
Landmine Impact Surveys. Whilst these surveys are vital information gathering tools there is 
scope for improving the management of the survey process. A more detailed review of 
surveys is set out at Annex J. 
 
• It is not cost effective for Delegations to engage their own permanent mine action 
specialists; however there is a key role for such specialists in project appraisal and project 
evaluation. Delegations are able to make use of the Framework Contract process to obtain 
access to specialist advice and should be encouraged to do so in order to ensure that, in 




The recommendations of the Team with respect to implementation and evaluation are set out 
below. 
 
Although Delegations are consulted on the identification of needs and priority actions, they 
should – in the context of Deconcentration - be given as much responsibility to design, contract, 
and monitor projects as possible, supported by appropriate technical assistance where 
necessary. Brussels should concentrate on strategic issues and not become involved in project 
management unless strictly necessary.  
 
All projects funded by the EC should be evaluated at least once in the three-year cycle referred 
to by Article 14 of the Regulation. 
 
Wherever possible and practicable, projects should be monitored by independent quality 
assurance teams in accordance with IMAS.30 All evaluations should take account of the latest 
relevant IMAS standards for evaluation: there is no need to continue work on the approach 
contained within the JRC Study Report on evaluation as it has largely been superseded by 
IMAS. 
 
Evaluations should look at two components: the technical conduct of the project (i.e. “is the 
organisation doing the job right?”) and the selection, outcomes and impact of the project (i.e. “is 
the organisation doing the right job?”) 
 
                                                 
30 The evaluation team wishes to note that it considers one part of the current IMAS to be flawed, IMAS 
09.20, “Post-clearance inspections and sampling”. In its current version IMAS 09.20 places too heavy a 
burden in terms of transaction costs and the Team have serious doubts about the statistical basis for the 
processes entailed within this IMAS. However, the team note that this IMAS is already under review by 
GICHD 
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The evaluation need not be carried out solely by the EC; if the project is also funded by other 
donors then the EC or the relevant Delegation can make use of synergy to either co-fund the 
evaluation or else make use of a credible and relevant evaluation carried out using appropriate 
methodology within the same time frame 
 
Whilst the evaluation may be organised and coordinated by a suitable agency recruited by the 
EC, the actual evaluators should be as independent as possible from any implementing 
organisation (or any coordination agency) at the time of the evaluation 
 
The amount of administrative credits for the thematic budget line should be significantly 
increased so that delegations are able to use them (and in particular the Commission 
Framework Contract) to fully support project assessment and evaluation. 
 
The difference between project evaluation (as covered by Articles 2.1(a), 11 and 13 of the 
Regulation) and strategic evaluation of the EC mine action mechanisms (as covered by Article 
14 of the Regulation) could perhaps be made more clear in the Regulation. 
 
The enclosed proposed Terms of Reference for Evaluation Missions (Annex D, Appendix 1) are 
recommended to the EC as a basis for future project evaluations. 
Global assessment of EC mine policy and actions: 2002-2004.  Final report.  March 2005 
 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  SUMMARY Page I 
SUMMARY OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This section collects together the recommendations made at the end of each chapter – it does 




There are four major recommendations for future MAS documents.   
The Commission is recommended to develop the following tools as a matter of some urgency: 
 
• A strategic logframe for EC mine action.  An example is included at Annex A. 
 
• A check list of eligibility for implementing organisations and potential projects 
 
• A rigorous Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) mechanism to score proposals in line with the criteria 
set out in the Regulation. 
 
A process to make requests for strategic plans from EC delegations, with an emphasis on multi-




Multi Criteria Analysis should be introduced as soon as possible to ensure a transparent and 
objective process in programming and reduce workload.  Other tools, such as the RIM diagram, 
may also be helpful and are strongly recommended.  The evaluation team recommends that 
sufficient resources should be made available to RELEX and/or EuropeAid for speedy 
implementation of such programming mechanisms in order to realize significant immediate and 
longer term benefits. 
 
Greater priority should be give to the coordination of information on the wide range of mine 
action activities within the EC.  This may require reallocation of some financial and human 
resources away from project implementation.  Improved data management, to allow better 
global reporting and hence complementarity, should be included in this coordination.  The 
deconcentration process should, as far as possible, be used to reduce Brussels project 
management activities in order to release staff time for this.  
 
The programme should continue to reflect Landmine Impact Survey  (LIS) priorities and support 
further LIS where appropriate.  Programming should strenuously avoid making funds available 
for purposes deemed to be low priority by a LIS. 
 
Land clearance and, in particular, some types of medical victim assistance are very costly and 
present large demands on limited resources.  Better value will probably be obtained by 
supporting “high added value” activities from the relatively small horizontal budget line, such as 
coordinating different donors and budgets to effectively jointly fund high-cost interventions. 
 
Support for new techniques and technologies should be reviewed and substantially improved.  
This will be primarily by changes to the programming and contracts by supporting fewer, larger, 
and especially longer, projects (not necessarily from the horizontal budget line).  The EC must 
be prepared to invest in the (sometimes substantial) increased initial cost of more efficient 
techniques in order to reap the mid- and long-term benefits and to give a global lead.   
 
 The “exit strategy” needs to be considered at programme level as well as project level so that 
sustainability criteria are fully met, best use is made of resources, and the visibility of the EC is 
improved.  This is particularly important in medical support to mine victims.   
 
Global assessment of EC mine policy and actions: 2002-2004.  Final report.  March 2005 
 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  SUMMARY Page II 






Project Cycle Management, a technique already widely used by EuropeAid, should be applied 
to all mine action, as far as the diversity of budget lines permits.  EuropeAid staff should take the 
lead in this and ensure the full cycle of PCM as well as Log Frame methods are used.  
 
Broadening the proposal base and reducing the percentage of bids rejected on technicalities 
are both necessary as a matter of urgency.  This should promote increased competition which 
can be expected to give better value, especially in clearance activities, which are very costly.  
Further use of commercial operators (in accordance with the APLR) should be included.  
However, support to “natural monopolies” such as NMAAs should be continued.  Improving the 
understanding by proposers of the Commission documentation is a first step to very significantly 
reducing the number of rejected proposals.  A vade mecum or similar guide (on paper or 
website) should be considered. 
 
Technical project assessment should be considerably strengthened to reduce the risk taken by 
the Commission and to improve quality and strategic value.  A dual knowledge base (binome) 
approach to project assessment should become the standard, using mechanisms which are 
already available.  This is especially important in view of the fragmentation effect of 
Deconcentration.  Funding for this should be made available as a priority, even at the expense 
of some project implementation. 
 
Project proposers and assessors should be encouraged to use criteria which focus on the true 
outcomes or outputs of a project and not on its activity.  The use of tendering (as opposed to 
proposals) by non-profit entities may be useful in this regard.  Efficiency should become a 
standard criterion in proposals in order to comply with the Regulation, a suitable approach 
would be a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Greater contractual rigour is needed to make sure that responsibility and authority are 
commensurate, are clearly stated in the project documents, and are enforced in practice.  Put 
bluntly, the Commission must learn to insist on better value for money and make better use of 
the services of agents where these are used as intermediaries. 
 
Projects with long-term local participation must be of a size and type that is feasible for local 
governments and organizations to continue.  The need for longer term refresher training and 
repeat accreditation should be considered in allocating funding. 
 
Project management and the contracting process should, as far as possible, be devolved to the 
Delegations in line with the principle of Deconcentration wherever the requirements of the NFR 
allow it. 
 
Chapter 4   
 
Although Delegations are consulted on the identification of needs and priority actions, they 
should – in the context of Deconcentration - be given as much responsibility to design, contract, 
and monitor projects as possible, supported by appropriate technical assistance where 
necessary. Brussels should concentrate on strategic issues and not become involved in project 
management unless strictly necessary.  
 
All projects funded by the EC should be evaluated at least once in the three-year cycle referred 
to by Article 14 of the Regulation. 
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Wherever possible and practicable, projects should be monitored by independent quality 
assurance teams in accordance with IMAS.31 All evaluations should take account of the latest 
relevant IMAS standards for evaluation: there is no need to continue work on the approach 
contained within the JRC Study Report on evaluation as it has largely been superseded by 
IMAS. 
 
Evaluations should look at two components: the technical conduct of the project (i.e. “is the 
organisation doing the job right?”) and the selection, outcomes and impact of the project (i.e. “is 
the organisation doing the right job?”) 
 
The evaluation need not be carried out solely by the EC; if the project is also funded by other 
donors then the EC or the relevant Delegation can make use of synergy to either co-fund the 
evaluation or else make use of a credible and relevant evaluation carried out using appropriate 
methodology within the same time frame 
 
Whilst the evaluation may be organised and coordinated by a suitable agency recruited by the 
EC, the actual evaluators should be as independent as possible from any implementing 
organisation (or any coordination agency) at the time of the evaluation 
 
The amount of administrative credits for the thematic budget line should be significantly 
increased so that delegations are able to use them (and in particular the Commission 
Framework Contract) to fully support project assessment and evaluation. 
 
The difference between project evaluation (as covered by Articles 2.1(a), 11 and 13 of the 
Regulation) and strategic evaluation of the EC mine action mechanisms (as covered by Article 
14 of the Regulation) could perhaps be made more clear in the Regulation. 
 
The enclosed proposed Terms of Reference for Evaluation Missions (Annex D, Appendix 1) are 
recommended to the EC as a basis for future project evaluations. 
 
Annex C: Mine Action Technology Research 
 
Funding for mine action technology should be increasingly focused on making the best possible 
use of existing technologies (both field proven and awaiting development past the initial 
prototype).  There appears to have been recognition of this need by the EC for several years but 
not the commensurate actions.  Test and Evaluation and Standards should be focused on 
supporting technologies which end-users want and need. 
 
The move towards integrating mine action technology research with risk management and other 
humanitarian technologies should be continued. 
 
Projects should be specifically required to show how their product could improve value for 
money from investment in mine clearance, before receiving funding.  
 
Evaluators able to consider project finance and economic aspects should be identified and 
included in project selection teams, in addition to technical specialists. 
 
                                                 
31 The evaluation team wishes to note that it considers one part of the current IMAS to be flawed, IMAS 
09.20, “Post-clearance inspections and sampling”. In its current version IMAS 09.20 places too heavy a 
burden in terms of transaction costs and the Team have serious doubts about the statistical basis for the 
processes entailed within this IMAS. However, the team note that this IMAS is already under review by 
GICHD 
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Annex J: Notes On Landmine Impact Survey Evaluation 
 
Surveys have usually been planned on the assumption that there will be no ‘false negatives’ 
and this has resulted in the need to extend (and hence re-finance) surveys after the ‘false 
negative’ approach was found to be unjustified. Surveys using false negative sampling should 
be planned to show a ‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ timescale. 
 
The use of IMSMA remained problematic over the period covered by this report and needs 
major review: the software should be freely available so that all mine action implementing 
agencies can make use of it to make reports, and more thought should be given to comments 
from the field on its structure (though the evaluation team notes that GICHD are undertaking a 
review of IMSMA at the time of this evaluation). 
 
As noted in the Scanteam report, the SWG/SAC processes are not fully transparent. There is a 
potential conflict of interest in that many members of the SWG are also survey implementers: 
surveys should be let by competitive tender using international competitive bidding processes 
and open to all qualified organisations – including commercial demining agencies or survey 
companies. It is the opinion of the Team that SAC should be encouraged to consider itself as 
the custodian of standards rather than as an implementer.  
 
The Team have heard some evidence that at least one survey was over-priced. The European 
Commission is strongly recommended to negotiate the most advantageous terms possible for 
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Annex A: Table A–1: EC Mine Action Strategy 2002-2004 – possible strategic logframe  
 Intervention logic Objectively verifiable 
indicators 
Sources of verification Assumptions Remarks 
Overall 
objectives 
To contribute towards the goal of total 
elimination of APL1(and other UXO2 
world wide in the coming years in areas 
where civil communities are trying to 
recover from armed conflict3 
Specific 
objective 
To manage the provision of EC funds to 
support mine action programs in a 




Full disbursement of EC funds in a timely 
manner to successful, effective and 
efficient mine action projects that are 
compliant with international mine action 
standards and the priorities suggested by 
data from landmine impact survey. 
Activities  Establishment and operation of 
project prioritisation and selection 
process with emphasis on 
effectiveness and efficiency 
 Development and maintenance of 
checklist for use by potential 
implementing partners 
 Solicit strategic plans from EC 
delegations 
 Coordination with other donors and 
other EC budget lines 
 Development of Multiannual strategy  
 Resource allocation between 
selected countries as part of annual 
work plan 
 Manage periodic project monitoring 
and evaluation 
 Generate annual reports 




 Fund disbursement 
 Reduction in 
casualty numbers 











 Numbers of 
landmines and 
UXO removed 
 Numbers of 
recipients of MRE 
training 
 Increase in 





 National mine 
action centre 
reports 
 Reports by EC 
Delegations 
 Casualty and 
landmine impact 
survey data 
 UN mine action 
agency reports 









 Financial records 
for EC budget lines 
 Tri-annual 
assessment 




 Security state 






life of projects 




through full use of 
Deconcentration 
process 
1. APL = Anti-
personnel 
landmine 
2. UXO = 
unexploded 
ordnance 
3. From Articles 1 
and 3 of APL 
Regulation 
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S = Specific 
M = Measurable 
A = Attainable 
R = Relevant 
T = Timely or time bound 
 
Figure 1.  SMART goal-setting criteria. 





Multi-criteria Analysis (MCA) can be defined as: 
 
 “ a way of looking at complex problems that are characterised by any mixture of 
monetary and non-monetary objectives, of breaking the problem into more manageable 
pieces to allow data and judgements to be brought to bear on the pieces, and then of 
reassembling the pieces to present a coherent overall picture to decision makers.  The 




SMART34 goal setting 
 
Project Management theory includes the use of SMART 
criteria as a means by which projects can be designed.  
Application of SMART criteria in the case of resource 
allocation for mine action could be as follows: 
 
• Specific: Resources are allocated to a particular outcome or capacity.   
 
• Measurable: Outputs and outcomes must be measurable by use of objectively verifiable 
indicators.   
 
• Attainable: The disbursement plan must be commensurate with the resources available.  
This suggests that the minimum unit of funding should be sufficient to run one mine action 
team (of whatever type) for one year, including an allowance for capital expenditure. 
 
• Relevant: Emphasis is to be placed on outcomes rather than output or activity 
 
• Timely: The timescale for the project shall be optimised for efficient resource usage, and 
funds disbursed as soon as possible.  This may mean a commitment to a particular team 
over the working life of the equipment, and may mean therefore a greater funding in Year 
One of the commitment in order to allow equipment to be purchased35. 
 
The use of SMART goal setting criteria also helps to maximise transparency, often a key 
requirement of donor organisations36.  As shown below, MCA can provide a SMART means of 
resource allocation. 
 
Scope: strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives 
 
                                                 
32 Extracted from a paper by Robert Keeley, Imperial College London, 2005 
33 Source: “Multi Criteria Analysis: A Manual” published by the UK Department of Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions, February 2001.  Following the reorganisation of government departments this 
manual can now be found at 
http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_about/documents/page/odpm_about_608524.hcsp 
34 Explanations of the SMART criteria technique may be found at 
http://web.mit.edu/hr/oed/learn/teams/art_newteam.html  and at  
http://www.goal-setting-guide.com/smart-goals.html 
35 The time span of programming decisions is covered in more depth in Chapter two of this Report. 
36 See for example Paragraph 19 of the Preamble of Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. 
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It is common practice to borrow some terminology from military theory in order to define the 
scope of different perspectives: from a ‘strategic’ view of the overall picture to more immediate, 
‘tactical’ decision making.  This provides a means to define the scope of the three major 
questions faced by the donor: 
 
• Strategic: how to decide between countries? 
 
• Operational: how to select the type of projects and the projects themselves? 
 
• Tactical: how to select implementing organisations? 
 
This Annex refers to the possible use of MCA in the strategic role, i.e. in allocating resources 
between ‘focus’ countries. The operational and tactical decisions are referred to in more detail in 
Chapters two and three of this report. 
 
 
Multi-criteria analysis as a strategic decision support tool 
 
MCA has the potential to assist donors in meeting their requirements for a decision support tool 
in resource allocation.  It is a transparent and objective method, which also allows stakeholders 
to give greater weight to issues that they feel to be of critical importance.  Filters can be used to 




Given that there are more than 83 countries with a landmine contamination problem37 it is 
unlikely that any one donor can make a significant difference by spreading resources amongst 
all of these countries (even if countries capable of funding their own clearance efforts are 
excluded).  It may therefore be appropriate for a donor to use filters to identify a shortlist of the 
most suitable potential recipients of funding.  In order to maximise transparency, a number of 
possible filters that would achieve this in an objective manner should be identified.  Two key 
examples are set out below. 
 
1. States Party to the 1997 Ottawa Treaty.  Some donors have a policy to prioritise support to 
States Party to the Ottawa Convention38.  However, this is problematic as it may 
discriminate against populations of countries that suffer from a contamination problem even 
where their governments have not yet adopted the Convention.  It may not therefore be 
possible to use accession to the Ottawa Convention as a filter – it may nevertheless be 
possible to use Ottawa accession – or progress towards it - as a means of ‘weighting’ the 
resource allocation process.  Weighting is dealt with in more detail below. 
 
2. Countries that have completed a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS).  A second possible filter is 
to exclude all countries that have not undertaken a credible national survey of their landmine 
problem (though of course such countries might be considered as candidates to receive 
funding to undertake a LIS).  In the last few years, the survey process has become codified 
and subject to international norms and quality assurance methodologies and is now known 
as a “Landmine Impact Survey” (LIS).  LIS assist donor officials in dealing with the problem 
of ‘asymmetric information’ (i.e. where the “seller” knows much more about the subject than 
                                                 
37 Source: “Landmine Monitor” Report 2004.  See http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/intro/hma#Heading646 
 
38 See for example Article 3 of the EC Anti-personnel Landmine Regulation. (Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in 
developing countries, and Regulation (EC) No 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries are together known as “the Anti-
personnel Landmine Regulation”.  Article numbering from 1724/2001 is used in this report.) 
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the “buyer”) and the LIS can thus be considered as a risk management tool for donors.  
Specifically, it is easier to be sure of the impact and the extent of the problem in a country 
that has had an LIS than one that has not.  Therefore, a donor is more likely to make an 
equitable division of resources amongst countries that have undertaken a LIS than amongst 




The identification and selection of criteria for consideration in an MCA is greatly simplified if the 
availability of a LIS is used as a filter as described above.  A LIS is structured to provide 
information on the following issues: 
 
• Numbers of Casualties 
 
• Extent of Contamination 
 
• Socio-economic impact of blockages (a blockage is where contamination prevents a 
community gaining access to otherwise productive land or other necessary resources.) 
 
Information on all of these criteria can be extracted – to a certain extent – from the LIS data.  
This is therefore a very cost-effective way of obtaining strategic information as it does not 
require further surveys39. 
 
There is one additional criterion that can be added at this stage: the total population of the 
affected country.  The reason for including population is to prevent inappropriate ‘dominance’ of 
one criterion by a large country; i.e. without the population criterion a moderate problem in a 
large country would dominate over a problem which was smaller in absolute terms but had a far 
more severe per capita impact in a much smaller country.   
 
Structure of the MCA table 
 
The possible structure of an MCA table used in resource allocation is explained in depth in the 
paper “Use of Multi-criteria Analysis in EOD resource allocation.40” An example is included at 
Appendix 1 to this Annex. 
 
Weighting, filtering and adjusting 
 
Stakeholders may feel that some criteria are more important than others41.  For example, 
stakeholders might feel that the casualty issue is so important that the number of casualties 
should be weighted by a large factor.  A second imperative might be to weight criteria to favour 
the least-developed countries – this could be done by identifying, for example, those countries 
that are recognised as being “heavily indebted developing countries” (HIDC), or by weighting in 
favour of “fragile states42”.  The use of HIDC or Fragile States criteria would depend on the aims 
of the donor, as use of HIDC would be compatible with a strategy of rewarding good 
governance whereas use of Fragile States would be compatible with a strategy of preventing 
                                                 
39 As is discussed in Chapter four of this Report, the LIS are limited to some extent in their treatment of some 
factors.  However this is probably a case where the increasing marginal costs of additional information 
become prohibitive; the results are probably ‘good enough’ for strategic decisions on resource allocation (and 
certainly better than anything that is currently being used, in terms of objectivity). 
40 Published in the Journal of Mine Action by James Madison University, 2003.  See 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/7.1/focus/keeley/keeley.htm 
41 For example, Paragraph 15 of the Preamble of the APL Regulation sets out the requirement for EC support 
for mine action to be compatible with other EC foreign policies. 
 
42 See for example the DFID definition of Fragile States in 
 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf 
Global assessment of EC mine policy and actions: 2002-2004.  Final report.  March 2005 
 
ANNEX B  MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS    ANNEX  B Page  4 
state failure – a different political aim.  A final example, mentioned above, is that the country’s 
accession to the Ottawa Convention could be rewarded by weighting in favour of States Party to 
the Convention with perhaps a lower weighting given to States working towards ratification of 
the Convention.   
 
Adjusting for Resilience 
 
Another important factor that can be taken into account is the resilience of the country.  In 
disaster management terms resilience is the ability of the country to withstand the impact of a 
disaster.  In the case of landmine and UXO contamination a country with a high population and 
a large economy will be more able to withstand the impact of even a high amount of 
contamination than a country with a smaller population and a less developed economy.  It may 
therefore also be appropriate to adjust the raw results to reflect resilience, by adjusting for the 
relative populations and wealth of the countries concerned.   
 
A possible MCA table is set out at Appendix 1 to this Annex.  This table uses the same principle 
of identifying the distribution of the problem on a percentage basis, in order to prevent large 
country dominance, as described above.  The table includes examples of filtering, weighting 
and adjusting as discussed above, and has deliberately been left blank as it is important, in 
order to ensure transparency and objectivity, to decide on weighting and filtering mechanisms 
before populating the table with data.  It is recommended that a suitable focus group be 
established to do this (see below). 
 
Objectivity and Transparency 
 
In all cases, the selection of criteria and the application of filters, weights and adjustments 
should be decided in advance by the stakeholders, not least to ensure that the weighting factors 
reflect appropriate foreign policy (see reference to HIDC and Fragile States above)43  Ideally, 
the criteria, filters and weights should be approved by an appropriate focus group (perhaps an 
Interservice coordination group in the case of the EC) in order to maximise transparency.  This 
should be done before inserting the data from the candidate countries, in order to prevent any 
possible accusations of bias in designing the various weighting mechanisms.   
 
 
Resource allocation on the basis of the MCA results 
 
Even once the MCA table has been designed, there is still a need to establish a rule set for 
utilising the results in order to make the output workable.  These are discussed in more detail in 
the paper at reference44 but, in summary, the principle is to divide the available resources 
amongst the candidate countries in the ratio determined by the MCA process.   
                                                 
43 This would also be appropriate in terms of Paragraph 15 of the Preamble of the APL Regulation. 
44 Paper by Robert Keeley, Imperial College London, 2005 “Multi-criteria Analysis as a possible resource 
allocation mechanism for small and large donors to mine action.” 
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The Next Step - RIM Analysis 
 
Analysis of potential candidate countries produces the results like those shown in the histogram 
at Figure 2, which shows the distribution of scores between the candidate countries.  The 
countries in the middle, with the highest scores (Group A), have both high impact and low 
resilience.  There is, however, an important difference between two other groups of countries – 
represented by the use of two ‘tails’ to the distribution in the histogram.  Essentially, these are 
groups of countries with “high impact and high resilience” (Group B) or “low impact with low 
resilience” (Group C).  By implication, this suggests there is in fact a fourth group: “low impact 
with high resilience” and indeed there is: many of the EC member countries could themselves 
be included in this category.  The city of Berlin is estimated, for example, to have some 6000 
unexploded aircraft bombs buried within it left over from the Second World War, but Germany 
has the resources to deal with this problem itself45.  Such countries are referred to here as 
“Group D” countries. 
                                                 
45 From interview by Robert Keeley, Imperial College London, with Berlin Police EOD team leader, 
December 2003. 
Figure 2.  Graph showing MCA scores based on analysis of Landmine Impact Surveys.  Series 1 shows the unadjusted 
scores; Series 2 shows the scores after adjustment for economic resilience (Keeley 2005).  Note how data can be 
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Very High MCA Score:
High impact,
Low resilience
Figure 3.  RIM Diagram showing relation to MCA results  
(Keeley and Gasser 2005). This diagram shows how the scores of different 
programs subjected to multi-criteria analysis (MCA) can be represented 
graphically. Programs tend to group depending on the impact of 




The distribution of 
countries into groups 
characterised by these 
‘meta criteria’ can be 
represented by the 
diagram shown in 
Figure 3.  This is a 
matrix of resilience and 
impact, hence “RIM 
analysis”.   
 
This argument is 
developed further in 
Chapter 2, which sets 
out that it is possible to 
use this diagram to 
identify appropriate 
types of program to be 
supported in each of 
these categories.  Such 
a process would solve 
many of the problems 
with resource allocation 
methodology observed 
in the 2002-2004 MAS.
Group A Group B 
Group C Group D 
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A B C
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (o) (p)
1 Number of casualties 0 0 0 -                  
2 Contaminated area (km2) 0 0 0 -                  See Note 1
3 Blockages 0 0 0 -                  
4 Population (absolute number) -                    -                 -                  -                  
5 HIDC member 0 0 0
6 GDP (PPP) -                    -                 -                  
7 Filter: Does LIS Exist? 0 0 0 See Note 2
8 Number of casualties 0 0 0 -                  
9 Contaminated area (km2) 0 0 0 -                  
10 Blockages 0 0 0 -                  
11 Population (absolute number) -                    -                 -                  -                  
12 HIDC member 0 0 0
13 GDP (PPP) 0 0 0
14 Casualty score 0 0 0 0
15 Contamination score 0 0 0 0
16 Blockage score 0 0 0 0
17 Population score 0 0 0 0 See Note 3
18 Total score (unweighted) 0 0 0
19 Casualties 0 0 0 0
20 Contamination 0 0 0 0
21 Blockage 0 0 0 0
22 Population 0 0 0 0
23 HIDC/HIPC member 0 1 1 1
24 GDP adjustment factor -        0.00 0.00 0.00 See Note 4
25 Casualty score 0 0 0
26 Contamination score 0 0 0
27 Blockage score 0 0 0
28 Population score 0 0 0 0
29 Total score (weighted) 0 0 0
30 Adjusted score (HIDC) 0 0 0
31 Adjusted score (HIDC and GDP) 0 0 0
Sources:
1 Survey Action Centre, 2005 www.sac-na.org
2 CIA Factbook http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
3 World Bank HIPC List Feb 2005
Notes
1 Contamination is based on approximate estimate of suspected hazard area. 
2 score 1= 'yes' 0 = 'not yet'. Filtered score is total unweighted score x LIS filter
3 score = - x where 'x' is percentage share of global population (i.e. total populations of all countries in analysis)
4
Step Seven: Adjusted for Resilience
Step Two: data collection (absolute numbers)
Step Three: filter for survey
Step Five: Assign weights
Step Six: Calculate weighted scores
Step Four: Unweighted scores
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentMDK:2026004
9~menuPK:528655~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00.html
Shows the factor by which the current GDP per capita would have to be multiplied to be the same as the reference GDP (i.e. highest 
GDP in MCA population)
Appendix 1 to Annex B: MCA Resource Allocation Table
Candidate Country Total RemarksCriteriaSer Weights
Step One: Identify candidate countries
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Annex C: MINE ACTION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH FUNDED BY THE EC46   
 
 
Two fundamental questions should be asked in assessing the EC funded humanitarian 
demining technology research: has it delivered useful results? - and has it offered value for 
money?  As with any research programme, positive outcomes cannot be guaranteed, and there 
is a need for both ambitious goals as well as realistic projects.  Research which does not 
achieve the expected outcome can still offer value for money, and conversely, getting to an end 
result is not necessarily a measure of how cost effective was the route taken. 
 
Summary of expenditure and projects 
 
Up to 2003 the EC had spent about 65 M€ in support of research and development of 
technologies for mine action47.  This was principally through the Joint Research Centre at Ispra 
(JRC) and the Information Society Technologies (IST) programme which forms part of the larger 
Framework Programmes for Research.  The IST programme was administered by Directorate 
General Information Society (DG INFSO), though some projects were initially administered by 
other Directorates General (DG).   Other DGs, including DG Research and DG Development 
also supported some further aspects of Mine Action Research.  Further information can be 
found in the reference in footnote 2. 
 
A list of EC funded mine action technology projects can be found on the Eudem website 
www.eudem.info (the Eudem2 project was financed through Framework Programme 5), INFSO 
expenditure on this research was about 15 M€ in FP4 (1994-1998) and 17 M€ in FP5 (1998-
2002).  In FP6 (2002-2006) humanitarian demining research and development was integrated 
into the wider topic of “Improving Risk Management”; one further project which focuses on 
demining was selected for funding of about 2 M€. 
 
The principal JRC expenditure was as follows: 
• In the 1999-2002 work programme: “SAI-2 Civilian de-mining” was allocated 15.3 M€, and 
“ISIS-18  Information systems in civilian demining” was allocated 5.4 M€.   
• In the 2003-2006 work programme, TETHUD (test and evaluation for humanitarian 
demining) is funded as one of four measures which collectively are allocated 27 M€.   
• Other funding was also used for developing the JRC test facilities (about 2 M€). 
• The JRC projects ARIS, MINETEST, SEARCH2, MINESIGN, SIGEX were all 100% funded 
from FP4, a total of 1.95 M€.   
• Other smaller amounts of funding from the horizontal mine action budget line and other 
sources have also been received by the JRC, for example in the Mine Action Strategy 2002-
2004 Test and Evaluation, and Standards were allocated 0.6 M€. 
 
Within the European Commission there is agreement that the fundamental Research and 
Technological Development and Demonstration (RTD) is to be done in the work funded by the 
IST programme and the JRC will offer support to Test and Evaluation and Standards activities 
and, in accordance with the JRC's wider mandate, will offer technical support to other 
Commission services.  This separation appears little understood outside the Commission48 and 
                                                 
46 One of the evaluation team (RG) declares the following interest: from 2001 to 2004 he was Project Officer 
for the mine action technology RTD projects of Directorate General Information Society.  His contract as an 
employee of the EC ended in October 2004. 
47 See preface to brochure “Humanitarian Demining – research and technological development funded by the 
European Commission” EC publications Office 2003, EUR 20830, ISBN 92-894-5942-5. The brochure can 
be downloaded from http://serac.jrc.it/publications/pdf/demining_no_sig_en.pdf  (In accordance with the 
interest declared in footnote 1, RG declares himself co-author of this brochure). 
48  For example the authoritative International Mine Action Standard IMAS 03.30 "Guide to the research of 
mine  action technology" First Edition  01 January 2003 states        
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should be better publicized. 
 
There is also, apparently, little understanding by demining practitioners of the role of and 
constraints to RTD within the Framework Programmes for Research.  The Framework 
Programmes are designed to bring emerging technologies from basic research through to a 
laboratory prototype which is capable of demonstrating the principle.  This research is 
undertaken by multi-national consortia, on the basis of a 50% contribution, and must be "pre-
competitive research" – support cannot be given to turn a working prototype into a commercial 
production item. 
 
The EC has recognised that a key problem lies not so much in developing new technologies to 
the stage of a laboratory prototype (which can be funded within the FP) but in moving from the 
functional prototype to a fully tested commercial product (which cannot be funded through the 
FP).  In 2003, the then European Commissioner responsible for research, M Philippe Busquin, 
noted49 “Even though research and technological development has had a measurable impact 
on the overall process of mine clearance, it must be recognised that the delivery of new tools 
and equipment to improve the search for individual mines has not met early expectations.  
Reasons for this are complex:  First, it is necessary to understand the considerable complexity 
of the mine clearance problem as a process to which risk assessment and management tools 
need to be applied.  Then, |there was] the initial lack of appreciation by some researchers of 
how to apply advanced technologies in developing regions. Finally, [there are] some significant 
non-technological problems in finding the resources needed to turn prototype into fully tested 




The brochure Humanitarian demining research and technological development funded by the 
European Commission50 contains information about the successes achieved by the various 
programmes; this information will not be duplicated here and interested readers are referred to 
this publication.  In the light of the high initial expectations, it would be easy to suggest that 
much of the work funded has been a failure – this is too simplistic a view and in practice most 
research outcomes cannot be divided neatly into either “success” or “failure”.  There are 
however a few particularly disappointing outcomes: notably the lack of support possible in the 
IST programme for realistic and modest proposals which did not make ambitious claims (see 
below), and in particular the failure of the JRC to deliver some of its own goals such as a 
statement of operational requirements (SOR)51 and generic data fusion algorithms for multi-




As long ago as 1997 the EC had recognized the need to develop technologies which (i) were 
needed and wanted by field practitioners (ii) could be brought into use quickly (iii) would be 
affordable and cost efficient.  The EC had also recognized the lack of a large enough market to 
make commercial investment attractive52.   
                                                                                                                                                    
"In the case of the European Union (EU),  […]Research into mine action technology is supported by the 
European Commission's Joint  Research Centre (JRC), Ispra in Italy."  There is no reference to the other 
significant parts of the RTD programme, or the national programmes within the EU which constitute a very 
significant part of the total research effort. 
49 Opening address to the 2003 EUDEM-SCOT conference 
 http://www.eudem.vub.ac.be/eudem2-scot/open_speech/busquin.pdf 
50 See also footnote 2 to this annex.  The brochure can be downloaded from 
http://serac.jrc.it/publications/pdf/demining_no_sig_en.pdf 
51 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining later addressed this task. 
52 See for example http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/hphd97co.htm and similar documents available on the 
Cordis website. 
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However, the range of instruments available to the EC to finance the necessary research and 
development were, and still are, very limited.  The need to avoid, at least in theory, a 
programme of purely scientific research with no commercial application, led to location of the 
research in the more product oriented IST programme and not in a pure research directorate.  
This IST programme has proved to be largely unsuitable for the small-scale development 
needed in a field where there is only a very limited market – the Framework Programmes for 
Research are more suited to trans-European industries like car and aircraft manufacture, and 
telecommunications.  The JRC is a scientific institution with a mandate to support Commission 
Policy and was accordingly allocated the appropriate scientific supporting role. 
 
The overall result was a focus on high-cost techniques, principally aimed at buried mine 
detection, often using multisensor detectors with data fusion. The reliance on these very 
advanced, even speculative, technologies – and the support for this by unsubstantiated over-
confident predictions of very short and entirely unrealistic time-scales and costs for 
implementation in the field – should have been challenged much earlier in the research cycle.   
In 1998 both research project consortia and also the JRC were confidently predicting highly 
advanced mine detectors "in the field by 200053" whereas in fact the first two-sensor detectors, 
even without data fusion, are still at the trials stage at the time of writing in 2005.   
 
In fairness to the EC, the evaluation team wish to point out that other mine action technology 
programmes of a similar nature, both national programmes in Europe and the very much larger 
research programmes in the USA, have not, in general, had significantly more success for 
exactly the same reasons.  Given that it is likely that many high priority areas will be cleared 
within 10 to 15 years (even if the 2010 Ottawa treaty deadline has to be extended), efforts and 
funding should now be directed at bringing into production the technologies which are already 
developed but have been “put on the shelf" for lack of funding to commercialise them. 
 
It is clear that funding for technology research and development, while essential in the long term 
to increase mine clearance efficiency, cannot be considered as belonging in the same category 
as funding for any type of direct mine action, whether for mine risk education, clearance or any 
other part of the wide range of activities.  The clear separation by the EC of the two funding 
streams is welcomed by the evaluation team.  However, as has been noted in chapter three, the 
current contracting process for mine clearance has a very significant negative impact on the 
take up of new and existing technologies and should be changed as soon as possible in order 
to support technology take-up, instead of, as at present, effectively prohibiting it.  
 
The current reduction of the INFSO humanitarian demining technology research programme 
and its incorporation with the wider "Improving Risk Management" strategic objective, in order to 
generate important synergies with other types of risk and the humanitarian response to crises, 
also appears to be well founded.  Moving the focus away from buried mine detection (despite 
the ongoing popularity of this theme in the media and in some political circles) and into areas 
where technology has already made a far more decisive impact on the overall mine clearance 
process (Area reduction54 and  Information Management55) is to be strongly welcomed (see 
also footnote 1). 
 
While the importance of test and evaluation and development of standards is recognized, these 
activities also need to be carefully focused and not approached with a “broad brush”.  There is 
                                                 
53 Dr A Sieber of JRC quoted in "Innovation & Technology Transfer" Newsletter of the Innovation 
Programme, November 1998.  www.cordis.lu/itt/itt-en/98-6/prog1.htm 
54 However, at the time of writing this Report, the evaluation team notes that there is no single widely 
accepted definition of ‘area reduction’ in the mine action community. 
55 Nevertheless, the mixed reception of some information technology implementations (as reported elsewhere 
in this Report) suggests that this must be approached in a focussed and market-sensitive manner. 
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little point in spending considerable amounts of money on testing equipment for which there is 
no demand and which field operators do not consider useful.   
 
Value for money 
 
It is difficult to agree, from the perspective of the end user, that either the INFSO programme or 
the JRC support to Mine Action Technology has offered good value for money.  Both have 
made real contributions (see brochure, footnote 2) but the overall cost of perhaps 65 M€ by 
2004, has not been reflected by commensurate technical advances, nor by equipment in the 
field, nor by crucial scientific contributions from the JRC. 
 
In the case of the JRC, the lack of published project results, scientific papers and financial 
reporting makes it difficult to even assess what a significant proportion of the money was spent 
on, and makes it impossible to draw the conclusion that value for money was achieved at all.  
Significantly better reporting should accompany the spending of public money than is available 
for a large part of the over 20 M€, which the JRC allocated to humanitarian demining in the 
1999-2002 JRC workprogramme (see funding allocation list, above).   
 
DG INFSO has published full details of its projects, particularly through the www.cordis.lu and 
www.eudem.info websites (including details of the IST actions undertaken for INFSO by the 
JRC). 
 
However, "value for money" as such is not even a criterion in the selection and evaluation of 
technology projects to be funded by the Framework Programme.  One of several questions 
asked is "are the resources appropriate to the task" but more fundamental questions about the 
affordability of the outcome by the intended end users, or value for money in a broader context 
are not asked and the independent evaluators do not in general raise the issue. This may be 
because there has been insufficient effort to recruit evaluators with a project finance or 
economics background; where this has been done then there is evidence that such questions 
are asked.  Such input is of less value when evaluators assess projects that have already been 




Funding for mine action technology should be increasingly focused on making the best possible 
use of existing technologies (both field proven and awaiting development past the initial 
prototype).  There appears to have been recognition of this need by the EC for several years but 
not the commensurate actions.  Test and Evaluation and Standards should be focused on 
supporting technologies which end-users want and need. 
 
The move towards integrating mine action technology research with risk management and other 
humanitarian technologies should be continued. 
 
Projects should be specifically required to show how their product could improve value for 
money from investment in mine clearance, before receiving funding.  
 
Evaluators able to consider project finance and economic aspects should be identified and 
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Evaluation can be defined as:  
 
“…. a process that tries to determine as systematically and objectively as possible the worth or 
significance of an intervention or policy. The appraisal of worth or significance is guided by 
reference to defined (and agreed) criteria such as relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact 
and sustainability of activities in light of the specified objectives. An evaluation should provide 
information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the 
decision-making process of project partners and donors”56. 
 
The EC Antipersonnel Landmine Regulation sets out, at Article 14 of regulation 1724/2001, the 
requirement for a triennial evaluation of the global contribution of the EC to mine action. The 
Regulation also sets out the requirement for individual projects to be subjected to evaluation. 
 
Detailed notes on existing IMAS and GICHD guidelines are included at Appendix 1 to this 
Annex; proposed Generic Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation of mine action projects 
are included at Appendix 2. The recommendations for the conduct of future evaluations are 
included in the main text of the Report. 
 
 
Overview of IMAS and GICHD Evaluation Guidelines 
 
GICHD have produced, or are in the process of producing, a series of documents that are of 
particular relevance to evaluation. The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) provide 
guidelines for almost the entire sphere of mine action, and more IMAS are currently in 
production. These IMAS have no legal status directly57, though they become legal documents 
when specifically referred to in contracts or when adopted as national standards. In an 
evaluation context, IMAS provide a framework against which processes in particular can be 
assessed, especially where mine action contracts require compliance with IMAS. Indeed, some 
IMAS deal specifically with issues of monitoring and evaluation. For example, IMAS 14.20 deals 
with “Evaluation of Mine Risk Assessment”, and IMAS 07.40 - 07.42 deal with the “Monitoring of 
Mine Action Organisations.” Some additional IMAS that are also relevant are currently in 
production, such as IMAS 14.10, which deals with the “Evaluation of Mine Action Programs.” 
Finally, as pointed out in the JRC Study Report “Producing Better Evaluation of EC Funded 
Mine Action Projects,”  2002,58, it is impossible to completely separate evaluation from the 
project appraisal and contract process, and relevant IMAS include IMAS 07.30-31 “Accreditation 
of Mine Action Programs” and IMAS 07.20 “Guide to Contracts” (currently in Draft stage). 
 
Additionally, GICHD are in the process of producing a handbook on the evaluation of mine 
action projects, with the title  “Evaluating Mine Action as Development: A Handbook of 
Methodology”. GICHD have been kind enough to share a copy of the draft of this handbook with 
the EC evaluation team. Though the handbook does not deal with the technical aspects of mine 
action (which are already largely covered in IMAS) it is, in effect, a very useful primer on the 
required aspects of social science aimed at people who are not social-scientists. This handbook 
                                                 
56 From The UNICEF Programme Policy and Procedures Manual (2001), as quoted in IMAS 07.11. See 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/IMAS_archive/MRE/0711.pdf 
57 However, IMAS do reflect “international best practice” and as such could provide a legal argument in the 
assessment of “duty of care” in which a court might ask why such a comprehensive framework of standards 
had not been used or had not been adhered to. 
58 Available from http://eu-mine-actions.jrc.cec.eu.int/ performance/final/studyfinal.pdf 
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also has the potential to be the source of an even-more simple aide memoire that could contain 
the absolute minimum of essential information in terms of ‘how to do’ an evaluation. 
The relevant IMAS are summarised below: 
 
Table D1: IMAS relevant to evaluation 
Ser IMAS Title Status Remarks 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1 07.10-11 Management of demining 
and MRE 
Approved  
2 07.20 Guide to contracts Draft  
3 07.30-31 Accreditation of mine action 
organisations 
Approved  
4 07.40-42 Monitoring of mine action 
organisations 
Approved  
5 09.20 Post-clearance inspections 
and sampling 
Approved Under review 
6 10.60 Accident investigations Approved  
7 14.10 Evaluation of mine action 
programs 
Draft  





The first conclusion that can be drawn from this global assessment is that, if it is to be effective, 
evaluation of mine action is a multi-skilled process. Whilst not forgetting the need to include 
essential mine action skills in the evaluation team, there is also a need for the evaluation team to 
have development and economic skills, plus access to specialist technological skills where 
necessary. 
 
Unfortunately, there remain at present no international standards for mine action technical 
advisors. The issue of training standards for deminers has been addressed by a series of CEN 
workshops in 2004-2005, which have also highlighted the need to develop minimum standards 
for technical advisors. It may be possible to do this via a new IMAS standard in the future. 
 
The second conclusion is that IMAS – whilst not yet complete – do provide the best framework 
for conducting evaluation of mine action programs at present. The proposed generic terms of 
reference at Appendix 2 provide a means for formulating the evaluation of EC mine action 
projects based on the use of IMAS. Indeed, in order for projects to be fully IMAS compliant they 




1. Assessment of the possible contribution to evaluation by International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) 
2. Proposed generic terms of reference for future EC project evaluations.
Global assessment of EC mine policy and actions: 2002-2004.  Final report.  March 2005 
 
APPENDIX  1 TO ANNEX D: IMAS   APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D Page  1 
Appendix 1 TO Annex D: ASSESSMENT OF THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO 
EVALUATION BY INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS (IMAS) 
 
Detailed comments on the relevant IMAS are set out below59. 
 
 
IMAS 07.10: Management of Demining 
 
IMAS 07.10 provides a good general overview to the structure and processes of a mine action 
programme (the diagram at Annex C is particularly useful) and hence provides a useful series of 
evaluation questions, such as: 
 
 Is the program compliant with IMAS 07.10? 
 If not, why not? 
 If not, what are the resource requirements required to obtain compliance? 
 
IMAS 07.10 also includes an interesting paragraph (Para 6.3) on the role of donors, which is set 
out in full below: 
 
 “Donor agencies are part of the management process, and as such have a 
responsibility to ensure that the projects they are funding are managed effectively, and 
in accordance with international standards. This involves strict attention to the writing of 
contract documents, and ensuring that demining organisations chosen to carry out such 
contracts meet the accreditation and licensing criteria. Donors, or their agents, are also 
partly responsible for ensuring that the standards and guidelines for quality 
management are applied. This responsibility and accountability is even greater when 
the national mine action authority is in the process of formation, and has not had the 
opportunity to gain experience”. 
 
This reinforces the role of the donors in quality management. 
 
 
IMAS 07.11: Management of Mine Risk Education 
 
IMAS 07.11 provides a useful overview of the structure and processes of a mine risk education 
component of a mine action programme. In many sections it duplicates much of the content of 
IMAS 07.10 but this is a result of using the ISO 9000 format for IMAS, which was essential in 
establishing a framework for IMAS.  The diagram at Figure 2 (page 6) of IMAS 07.11 is 
particularly useful in showing how evaluation fits in to the MRE process. IMAS 07.11 refers to 
the need to collect data for the planning and evaluation of MRE, a point that is perhaps 
underemphasised in the GICHD handbook discussed above and almost ignored in the JRC 
study report. IMAS 07.11 includes the caveat that 
 
“In practice, the evaluation of MRE is usually difficult to achieve as it may not be 
possible to identify the connections between the cause (i.e. the MRE intervention), and 
the effect (i.e. behavioural change)60” 
 
This issue of effectiveness will be addressed in more detail as part of the review of IMAS 14.20 
below, though this team suggest that of the five criteria quoted above (and in IMAS 07.20 itself), 
i.e. relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability then at least three of the five 
could be comparatively easily assessed, whilst effectiveness and impact could be assessed 
                                                 
59 Note: in all cases these reviews are of the latest available version of the IMAS. See 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm#extant  
60 IMAS 07.11 Edition One (2003) Page 8 Para 6.5 
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using a Knowledge, Attitude and Practices (KAP) survey (though with the associated cost of 
doing so). It is perhaps surprising that even though the IMAS puts such an emphasis on data 
feedback (in Figure 2) it then appears to shy away from statements as to how this might be 
done, though it does say that these areas are addressed in other IMAS (see below). 
 
 
IMAS 07.20: Guide to contracts (draft) 
 
Not available at the IMAS website61 as at the time of writing. 
 
 
IMAS 07.30: Accreditation of mine action organisations 
 
IMAS 07.30 sets out some clear guidelines for the accreditation of either national or international 
demining organisations. This includes a review of the organisations on standing operation 
procedures (SOP), which provides a focus for evaluation, in that the organisation can be 
reviewed against its compliance with IMAS and any national standards, and its conformance 
with its own SOP. However, IMAS 07.30 also sets out the responsibilities of donors in Para 7.4, 
which is repeated in full below:  
 
“When the contract or other formal agreement has been framed by the donor 
organisation, it shall be responsible for including details of the national accreditation 
requirements, or in the absence of a national mine action authority requirements 
established by the UN or other appropriate international body”. 
 
In other words, in order to be IMAS compliant the donor has a duty to ensure that the 
organisation is accredited, and, by implication, the donor should also ensure that the 
organisation is of a standard to be accredited before the contract is let. 
 
 
IMAS 07.40: Monitoring of mine action organisations 
 
IMAS 07.40 provides very clear guidelines on the conduct of monitoring procedures, and in Para 
5.2.1 makes this the role of the national mine action authority:  
 
“The national mine action authority shall monitor the demining organisation and its sub-
units to confirm that the management systems and operational procedures are 
consistent with the terms of the accreditation and licenses”. 
 
However, IMAS 07.40 is vague on the frequency of the monitoring process, as stated in Para 
5.2.1: 
“The frequency of monitoring should be dependent on the task and the previous 
performance of the demining organisation; it should be agreed between the national 
mine action authority and the demining organisation”. 
 
Furthermore, IMAS 07.40 is completely silent on monitoring the impact or effectiveness of the 
mine action activity; however these are referred to in the new GICHD handbook and should 
presumably also be covered by the new IMAS 14.10 (currently in draft). IMAS does provide 
some comment on the responsibilities of donors, in Para 7.4: 
“When the contract or other formal agreement has been framed by the donor 
organisation, it shall be responsible for including details of the monitoring requirements, 
                                                 
61 www.mineactionstandards.org 
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or in the absence of a national mine action authority, requirements established by the 
UN or other appropriate international body”. 
 
Therefore, in order to be fully IMAS compliant, donors must include a monitoring component 
within their contracts. Monitoring is clearly a transaction cost, and, according to IMAS, one that 
should be borne by the national mine action authority. Presumably, therefore, IMAS 07.40 
expects the donors to assist national mine action authorities in meeting this responsibility; this 
can be by providing resources for the mine action authority to carry out the monitoring directly 
or, as allowed by Para 6.1, provide for this service to be provided under contract62. 
 
 
IMAS 07.41: Monitoring of MRE organisations 
 
IMAS 07.41 follows a similar structure to IMAS 07.40, though it does link the monitoring process 
more clearly to the project cycle and evaluation. IMAS 07.41 also provides some guidance on 
how monitoring should be conducted (see the note in Para 9.2(f)) though this could perhaps be 
expanded.  
Significantly, in the context of this Report, it also sets out some responsibilities for donors in 
Para 9.4: 
 
“When funding MRE projects, donors:  
a) should ensure that project proposals include sound and detailed monitoring plans; 
b) should provide the necessary resources to enable the implementing organisation to 
conduct comprehensive and effective monitoring 
c) should recognise that monitoring may recommend changes to their funded 
activities, and should enable such changes to be readily made 
d) may monitor projects and programmes funded directly by them” 
 
Whilst most of these obligations reflect requirements set out in other IMAS as described above, 
Para 9.4 c) has a unique requirement of the donors, which could mean a change of funding 
requirements at mid-project depending on the finding of the monitors. This may suggest a 




IMAS 10.40: Accident investigations 
 
The relevant paragraph of IMAS 10.40 in this context is Para 4.3 which states: 
 
“The following information should be widely distributed:  
a) the circumstances contributing to and harm resulting from the incident 
b) an analysis of the information collected during the investigation; and 
c) the findings of the investigation (i.e. the conclusions and recommendations drawn 
from the investigation process) 
 
The national mine action authority, or an organisation acting on its behalf, shall disseminate 
information on demining incidents. In the absence of a national mine action authority, 
demining organisations should make this information available to other demining 
organisations through UNMAS”.  
 
The dissemination of such information is vital in ensuring that the risk of accidents being 
repeated is minimised. However, it is known to this Team that some organisations do not 
comply with these requirements. It is therefore strongly recommended that the EC specifically 
                                                 
62 This principle is also set out in Para 5.1 of IMAS 07.41 (Monitoring of MRE organisations). 
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compels funded organisations to comply with this requirement and make the retrieval of such 
documentation a core part of the monitoring and evaluation process. 
 
 
IMAS 14.10: Evaluation of mine action programmes  
 
Currently in draft by GICHD 
 
IMAS 14.20: Evaluation of MRE  
 
IMAS 14.20 provides clear strategic guidance for the evaluation of MRE, and specifically points 
to the use of KAP surveys in Para 4 (see above for previous discussion of KAP surveys). 
Indeed, in the absence of IMAS 14.10 much can be drawn from the general principles set out in 
IMAS 14.20. IMAS 14.20 also provides guidance for donors in Para 7.4, which states: 
 
“Donor organisations:  
a) should ensure that projects have an evaluation component and the necessary 
resources to undertake them; and 
b) should evaluate the projects they have funded and should take into account 
evaluation findings and recommendations for future funding of mine action 
programmes”. 




Additional GICHD Documentation 
 
As mentioned in Annex D, GICHD are in the process of producing a handbook on the 
evaluation of mine action projects, entitled “Evaluating Mine Action as Development: A 
Handbook of Methodology”. One element that is not currently included63 but might be 
worthwhile, given the general approach of the handbook, is consideration of the transaction 
costs of evaluation and the diminishing marginal returns of information. Any evaluation that 
requires surveying of beneficiaries in the field, be it by formal or PRA methods, will cost a lot 
more than an evaluation carried out by literature review or by stakeholder analysis in the capital 
city, though it might well produce more credible data. This is all implied in the text but it would be 
worth a paragraph or two pointing out the logistic requirements of a field approach, lest 
enthusiastic donors start insisting that a standard three-week evaluation mission should also 
produce quantitative data on impact, based on a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) of one or 
two provinces. Furthermore, the handbook does not explain the use of knowledge, attitudes and 
practices (KAP) surveys as a means of gathering information about behaviour change, which is 
particularly relevant in the case of mine risk education (MRE) projects.  
                                                 
63 These comments have also been fed back to GICHD and it is conceivable that the final version of the 
handbook may have taken these comments into account. 
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Appendix 2 TO Annex D: PROPOSED GENERIC TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR 










The aim of this document is to set out the Terms of Reference (TOR) for an evaluation of the 
(insert organisation name) in (insert programme name) over the period (insert period here) in 
accordance with the evaluation requirements set out in Articles 13 and 15 of “Regulation (EC) 
No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001, concerning 
action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries”66. 
 
 
Goals of the evaluation 
 
The goals of the evaluation include: 
 
 improvement of the program or project being evaluated 
 generating knowledge and learning for wider application (lessons learned and missed 
opportunities)  
 making project results transparent and accountable 




Normative references include: 
 
 The regulation 
 International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)  
 National mine action standards (as available)  
 Terms and conditions of contract (insert contract details here) including scope of works and 
works plan 
 Contracting organisation’s standing operation procedures 
 
 
Specific Issues to be addressed 
 
In general, evaluation can be conducted by considering the following attributes67: 
 
 Is the project relevant – i.e. the extent to which the project/program is suited to the 
particular needs, expectations and priorities of the target group, national mine action 
authority (NMAA) (if existing), implementing organisation and the EC (as expressed in the 
terms of the original contract).  
                                                 
64 Produced by Robert Keeley, 2005, and provided for incorporation into this Report. 
65 Name of the organisation being evaluated. Subsequently referred to as “The Organisation”. 
66 Subsequently referred to as “The Regulation”. 
67 Based on concept set out in IMAS 14.10 (Amendment 1) Para 4 
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 Is the project effective – i.e. the extent to which the project achieves its objectives and goals 
as set out in its contract. This should be apparent from study of the project logical framework 
and comparison of the actual achievements with the stated outputs.  
 Is the project efficient – i.e. the extent to which the project outputs (qualitative and 
quantitative) are achieved in relation to the inputs, i.e. resources and cost. 
 What is the impact or outcome – i.e. the benefits and costs of the project/program, 
whether directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. Political, socio-economic, 
environmental and cultural issues should be addressed. In the logical framework the 
intended impact is encapsulated by the ‘outcomes’ box68. 
 Is the activity sustainable - the probability that the benefits achieved by the project will 
continue after donor funding and/or specialist assistance (such as international technical 
advisors) has been withdrawn. This is to be included if the terms of the original contract 
stipulated that the projects/ programmes should be financially and technically sustainable. 
 
To this end, the evaluation team should investigate the following issues: 
 
• The methodology used by the Organisation to prioritise work and allocate resources 
between projects at a programme level, including any linkages with broader humanitarian or 
development contexts 
• The technical standards and work practices followed by the Organisation, including 
o The methodology used by the Organisation to select a particular technique or tool 
for employment 
o Review of reports of casualties amongst Organisation staff, amongst civilians (or 
reports of ‘missed mines’) on land processed by the Organisation (where any such 
incidents have occurred within the scope of this evaluation)  
• Management of funds provided to the programmes 
 
In considering these issues, the evaluation team should take into account the following criteria 
 
• Organisational competence 
• Individual competence of individual managers and staff 
• Means used by the Organisation to maximise cost effectiveness69 
• Means used by the Organisation to maximise cost-efficiency 
• Quality of output 
• Workplace safety 
• Ability to innovate 
• Transparency of activities, including cooperation with any national reporting requirements 
• Ability to cooperate with other organisations 
 
• Support for capacity building at all levels 




                                                 
68 For the purposes of this document the ‘impact’ is the degree to which the project/program contributes to 
the ‘overall objectives’ as written in EC logical frameworks, which may involve factors outside the direct 
control of the project/program, whilst ‘outcome’ is the degree to which the project/program has an effect on 
the lives of the beneficiaries. 
 
69 For the purposes of this evaluation, the term ‘cost-effectiveness’ is used to describe the means by which a 
given outcome or benefit is achieved at the lowest cost. An example may be the use of vegetation cutting 
machines to facilitate the access of manual deminers. ‘Cost Efficiency’ is used to describe the ratio of outputs 
to inputs, measured in terms of cost. It may be considered the extent to which the potential cost effectiveness 
of a particular approach is actually achieved. 
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When evaluating the conduct of the program/project (delete as applicable) the evaluation team 
should take care to compare performance with the following benchmarks: 
 
• Compliance with any contractual obligations, including works plans 
• Conformance with:  
o International best practice as encapsulated within relevant International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS)  
o Any applicable national mine action standards 
o The organisation’s own global and national SOP 
• Comparison with performance by other mine action organisations in the same context, 
where appropriate. 
 
The evaluation is to involve a mix of document review, interviews, survey by questionnaire and 
field visits. Useful descriptions of the use of such tools are included in the (draft) handbook on 
evaluation published by GICHD70. 
 
The evaluation team should take account of the recommendations for the conduct of evaluation 








• International mine action coordination bodies operating in the countries that include projects 
by the target organisation 
 
• National mine action authorities in the countries that include projects by the Organisation 
 
• Any development organisations operating in partnership with the Organisation on specific 
projects 
 




Apart from the clear and substantial input that the Organisation and its field offices will be able to 
make in terms of describing their current activities, ethos and working practices, the 
Organisation should also be given the opportunity to comment on any problems with existing 
contractual arrangements, including any directions to work in particular regions, follow particular 
priorities or other contractual requirements that the Organisation feels result in sub-optimal 
performance. The Organisation may also wish to highlight any particular successes with certain 
arrangements.  
 
Evaluation Project Management 
 
The Evaluation Team should report to (insert here) who will act as Project Coordinator on behalf 
of the donors. Any changes to the scope or extent of the evaluation or its TOR should be 
negotiated with the Project Coordinator. 
 
 
                                                 
70 “Evaluating Mine Action as Development: A Handbook of Methodology” 
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Scope of the evaluation 
 
Whilst the evaluation team are expected to become familiar with the history of the Organisation 
from its beginnings, the evaluation itself should focus on activities between (insert dates and any 





The evaluation team should consist of a development specialist able to assess the 
Organisation’s contribution and effectiveness in addressing development problems, supported 
by a mine action specialist able to assist with an evaluation of technical procedures and 
standards followed by the Organisation. Whilst this mine action specialist may be a former 
employee of the Organisation, between them the team must have experience of the wider mine 
action sector in order to make objective comparisons with other organisations’ approaches 





The time frame of the evaluation is (insert depending on complexity of the evaluation), including 
3-5 days visiting the Organisation’s headquarters (depending on travel requirements) and 12 
days for each field visit, including travelling time to and from the relevant country. This includes 
time required for document review and preparation of reports. Where possible, the exact timing 
and duration of field visits to be agreed with the relevant Organisation country offices in order to 
facilitate the development of timetables, to minimise the administrative impact of the visits and 
work around any limitations to local travel. Where delays are unavoidable, the evaluation may 
include a no-cost extension of up to 30 days in order to incorporate these delays. Any potential 
delay of the project should be reported to the Project Coordinator as soon as a need becomes 
apparent and any further extension of the project beyond the 30 day no-cost extension already 





The evaluation team is expected to reach conclusions and make recommendations for 
improvements, either by the Organisation or the contracting and coordination mechanisms to 
which they are responsible. The outputs of the evaluation team are to be encapsulated in 
reports as set out below:  
 
 An inception report, setting out the details of the methodology to be followed by the team, 
including confirmation of countries for field visits, reference to any changes in the 
methodology as set out in this TOR and an outline works plan including agreed dates for 
visits to the headquarters of the Organisation, field visits and presentation of the draft report 
and final report. This inception report to be part of the tendering process if the evaluation is 
carried out on a corporate basis, or on establishment of team if individual consultants are 
recruited, in which case it should be completed within the first week of the project). 
 
• Interim reports, to be submitted to the Project Coordinator within 72 hours after the visit to 
the Organisation’s headquarters and after each field visit. The main aim of the interim 
reports is to chart the progress of the evaluation and all findings should be set out in detail in 
the main reports to be completed at the end of the evaluation, as set out below. These are 
to be brief reports – ideally on one A4 (or similar size) sheet - and should set out in note or 
tabular form the extent of success of the visit in meeting its objectives and summarise any 
particular successes or problems encountered, either in terms of the conduct of the visit or 
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in activities being carried out by the Organisation. The format of the interim reports should 
be confirmed as part of the inception report.  
 
• A summary of current programmes and projects by the Organisation (based on data 




o Type of programme/project 
o Area of operations 
o Start date and expected finish date 
o Donor(s)  
o Any development partners or coordination organisations 
o Value of programme/project 
o Any extant evaluation or audit reports 
o Program results and achievements 
 
• An aide memoire of the evaluation team’s initial findings to the Organisation, providing them 
time to comment before the completion of final reports. 
 
• A Draft final report, taking account of any responses by the Organisation to the aide 
memoire. The evaluation team should prepare a verbal and/or ”Powerpoint” summary of the 
draft report for presentation to donors. 
 
• A final report, taking account of donor feedback from the Draft Report. The format of the 
final report may follow the format laid out in the (draft) handbook on evaluation referred to 
above, such as the generic layout which is included at Annex A to this TOR. 
 
All reports are the property of the donors. All interim, draft and final reports are to be considered 
confidential and are not to be released without the express permission of the donors via the 
Project Coordinator. The Organisation may release the aide memoire at their discretion, 





The team should be prepared to arrange all necessary administrative and logistic support, 
including visas, flights, insurance and vaccinations, including travel to the Organisation’s 
headquarters and a presentation of the Draft Report in Brussels if required. Funding for such 
activities should be included in the contract along with an allowance for local expenses including 





It is assumed that: 
 
• The Organisation will facilitate access to all relevant documentation, including access to all 
relevant evaluation and audit reports covering the period covered by the scope of this 
evaluation. 
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• Relevant EC Delegations, assisted by the Organisation’s country offices will be prepared to 
assist in arranging visas, visit timetables, local accommodation, local travel and advice on 
local security precautions. 
•  Other stakeholder organisations will respond as set out above 
• Full access will be possible for travel to field projects. 
 





Possible Report Format71 
 




 Title Page, including name of agency or individuals conducting the evaluation 
 Table of Contents, including list of Annexes and Enclosures 








 Brief commentary on the project’s context, its scope and design, the evaluation team, the 
methodology, the report presentation and other introductory remarks 




 An analytical commentary on the conditions that have an impact on the project/program 
being evaluated, including institutional, managerial, socio-economic, safety and other 
conditions, as well as ongoing related projects, partnership arrangements, etc. 
 





 Describe the extent to which the project/program is suited to the particular needs, 
expectations and priorities of the target group, national mine action authority (NMAA) (if 
existing), implementing organisation and the EC (as expressed in the terms of the original 
contract) 
 Topics related to relevance include considerations such as the quality of needs assessment, 
identification of the appropriate scope and design elements, the project’s integration into a 




                                                 
71 Based on format included in the GICHD publication: “Evaluating Mine Action as Development: A 
Handbook of Methodology” but developed to include the main findings of this Report. 
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 Describe the extent to which the project achieves its objectives and goals as set out in its 
contract. This should be apparent from study of the project logical framework and 
comparison of the actual achievements with the stated outputs 
 
Outcomes and Impacts  
 
 Describe the outcomes and impacts of the project/program, with reference to the logical 




 Set out the extent to which the project outputs (qualitative and quantitative) are achieved in 
relation to the inputs, i.e. resources and cost 
 Include consideration of management issues such as the quality and motivation of staff, use 
of equipment, quality of supervision, work planning, coordination, communication, donor 




 This is to be included if the terms of the original contract stipulated that the projects/ 
programmes should be financially and technically sustainable 
 Assess the probability that the benefits achieved by the MRE project will continue after 
donor funding and/or specialist assistance (such as international technical advisors) has 
been withdrawn  
 
Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons Learned 
 
 Assess degree of success or failure the project/program has attained 
 Lessons learned should be formulated to a level of abstraction that allows application to 
other situations of a similar nature 
 Lessons can be both positive (to repeat in the future, and negative (to avoid in the future) 
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Annex E: COMPILED EC DELEGATION RESPONSES 
 
Note: replies from eight Delegations have been compiled anonymously, and shown in Times New Roman 
italic text. 
 
Q1. Have you ever received a copy of EC mine action evaluation guidelines72?  
 
Of the eight respondents, only one claims to have seen the JRC Study Report. 
 
Q2. If the answer to Q1 is ‘yes’ have you ever made use of it?  
 
One respondent replies “yes”, though from their description of the document it suggests that they are in 
fact referring to other documentation.   
 





Q4. Have any of the mine action projects under your remit been subject to any form of external 
evaluation within the period 2002-2004, commissioned either by yourselves or another donor? If so 
please provide details below 
 
Two Delegations report that there have been external evaluations, both EC and multi-donor.  
 
 
Q5.  Have you found (a) the APL Regulation73 (b) the “EC Mine Action 2002-2004 Strategy and 
Multiannual Indicative Programming Document” to be of assistance in planning, managing or 
coordinating assistance to mine action projects? (Please mark accordingly) 
 
APL regulation 





2 2 4 (see note below)   
 
Strategy and Multiannual Indicative Programming 





2 2 4 (see note below)   
 
If you have found either of these to be “very” useful or “very” obstructive please provide an 
explanation in the box below. 
 
 
                                                 
72 Producing Better Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Projects, prepared 2002 Available from http://eu-
mine-actions.jrc.cec.eu.int/ performance/final/studyfinal.pdf 
73 Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, concerning action against 
anti-personnel landmines in developing countries, and Regulation (EC) No 1725/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries.  
Together these are known as “the Anti-personnel Landmine Regulation”. 
Note: 2 delegations report that they have not seen these documents. 
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Q6. Please provide a short description of any significant successes in terms of EC contribution to 
any aspect of mine action in your area of responsibility over the period 2001-2004, highlighting if 
possible any points where The Regulation or other elements of EC mechanisms were particularly 
useful in achieving this success. 
Five Delegations reported positive outcomes to projects, including Landmine Impact Survey, 
institutional strengthening and clearance. One other said that it was too early to comment on recent 
projects that have just commenced. 
 
 
Q7. Please provide a short description of any significant problems in terms of EC contribution to 
mine action in your area of responsibility over the period 2001-2004, highlighting if possible any 
points where The Regulation or other elements of EC mechanisms were particularly relevant in 
causing these problems.  
 
Three Delegations responded to this difficult question: all referred to political difficulties with national 
institutions, in some cases leading to cancellation of projects. One also referred to “unrealistic project 
design,” which is also reflected in the responses to the Implementer questionnaire. 
 
Q8. Where you have identified problems in Q6, please provide a short description of how the 
problems were overcome, so that lessons may be learned from this in the future. 
Two Delegations replied to this question: one stressed the value of Technical Assistance to overcome 
problems, plus the importance of coordination with other donors (an experience that is shared by the 
evaluation team); the other said that no solutions were available at the time: better communication is 
needed in future. 
 
Q9. Please provide any other comments in terms of EC contribution to mine action that you think 
may provide useful in terms of this evaluation or in improving EC mechanisms for the future. 
One Delegation predicted the increased use of commercial demining arrangements, but predicted 
difficulties making use of such arrangements with current mechanisms (See Chapter 3 for further 
discussion of this issue).  
 
Another talks about the need for “Improvement of the system related to exchange of the 
information and coordination between national and horizontal EC programme dealing with mine 
action” (See Chapter 2 for extensive discussion of this issue) 
 
A third says “Improve communications to gain better conditions of local conditions; change budget 
format [tendering processes]” 
 
Q10. This questionnaire is primarily about EC mechanisms. However, if there is a particular 
implementing partner that has carried out exceptional work or, conversely, has proved very 
difficult to deal with, please note below.  
Only one Delegation responded here, saying “The government is very uncooperative due to political 
concerns on border issues” 
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Annex F: COMPILED IMPLEMENTING PARTNER COMMENTS 
 
Note: replies are compiled anonymously, and shown in Times New Roman italic text. 
 
Q1. Has your project ever been evaluated by an EC evaluation mission74?    
 
Only three out of ten respondents reported being evaluated. One of these was a UNDP evaluation mission. 
 
Q2. If the answer to Q1 is ‘yes’ did you receive a copy of the evaluation report?  Yes/No 
 
All three of the respondents report that they saw the evaluation report. 
 
Q3. If the answer to Q2 is ‘yes’ please provide comments on its usefulness or otherwise. A copy of 
the report would be very helpful. 
 
 
Q4.  Have you found the EC planning, project submission and funding process to be of assistance 
in planning or managing assistance to your mine action project(s)? (Please mark accordingly) 
 
Very easy to deal 
with 
Mildly easy No noticeable 
difference to other 
mechanisms 
Mildly frustrating Very frustrating 
and difficult 
 2 3 3 2 
 
If you have found the EC planning, project submission and funding process to be “very” useful or 





Q5.  In the case of single sourced projects, are any other donor funding sources available for mine 
action projects?  
Six respondents stated that they had access to other donor funds. 
 
                                                 
74 This includes if you have been evaluated by a multi-donor evaluation mission where the EC was 
one of the contributing donors. 
Two of the evaluation reports are available to the Team. 
 
Two of the three respondents said the evaluation was useful. 
 
Respondent B listed a series of complaints about lack of consultation by EC and promised funds that 
have not materialised. However other reports from this country suggest this is probably due to 
structural problems with the institution in question. 
 
Respondent F complained about the apparent eligibility of a project that was initially rejected 
 
Respondent J said the tendering procedures were not clear and expressed dissatisfaction with the 
pass/fail process. However, the problem with tendering may be a language issue (the questionnaire 
was electronically translated which may indicate they do not have access to good English language 
speakers) 
 
Respondent K described significant problems with delays and continuity of funding. Says problem is 
exacerbated by processing via UN 
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Q6. Please provide a short description of any significant successes in terms of EC contribution to 
your project(s) over the period 2002-2004, highlighting if possible any points where EC 
mechanisms were particularly useful in achieving this success. 
Varied responses from seven respondents, summarised as follows: 
 
“EC early commitment to process stimulated other donors” 
“Technical assistance with developing national regulations” 
“Provision of high calibre training” 
“Significant contributions to survey, institutional strengthening and material assistance” 
“Channelling of funds bilaterally (i.e. not through UNDP) improves effectiveness” 
“Reported successes in clearance and institutional strengthening projects” 
“clearance achieved once funds available” 
 
Q7. Did the EC funding processes (and, where applicable, the EC strategy documentation) make it 
clear which type/scale/location of projects were more (or less) likely to be successful in funding 
applications? Please provide details below. 
 
Eight generally positive responses, as follows: 
 
Four respondents said documentation was clear or very clear 
 
One said EC documents were good road map, though some problems with coordination and technical 
assistance mentioned (however this respondent also made other positive reports about technical 
assistance) 
 
Two said documentation could be clearer. 
 
One replied “not really” 
 
Q8. Please provide a short description of any significant problems or constraints in terms of EC 
contribution to your mine action project(s) over the period 2002-2004, highlighting if possible any 
points where the EC funding mechanisms were particularly relevant in causing these problems 
(such as delays between application, approval and/or disbursement). Other relevant constraints 
would include demands by the EC in terms of target regions or priorities which you feel were sub-
optimal. 
All ten reported problems.  
 
Five out of ten reported problems with delays (one mentioned delay of 1-2 years between beginning of 
process and disbursement) 
 
One commented on high retention rates (reporting rates of some 30% compared with “commercial” rates 
of 10%) on payments, causing significant cash flow problems 
 
One said that proposals were out of touch, saying “The 2003 and 2004 calls set both geographic and 
thematic priorities which do not necessarily correspond to our assessment of the needs in a country. Also 
artificial requests for emphasis on victim assistance not in line with actual situation” Note: This complaint 
was also reflected in the answers of another respondent and from field visits (reported elsewhere). 
 
One does not like the project appraisal process used in the evaluation of proposals 
 
One said that it is almost impossible to comply if there is any capital equipment procurement…(See 
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Q9. Where you have identified problems in Q8, please provide a short description of how the 
problems were overcome, so that lessons may be learned from this in the future. 
Only one respondent could provide an actual answer to this question: “Negotiated changes in framework 
agreement and provision of no-cost extension” 
 
Three other respondents used this space to repeat general criticism as listed above. 
 
Q10. Please provide any other comments in terms of EC contributions that you think may provide 
useful in terms of this evaluation or in improving EC mechanisms for the future. 
Five respondents answered this question. The answers are summarised as: 
 
EC funded projects overlapped with UNDP. EC should discuss projects in advance to coordinate with 
mine action here 
 
it would help if project funding cycle were coordinated with local fiscal year 
 
There are not many projects that are submitted; So, the EC should not reject proposals just for 
administrative reasons 
 
Tender processes take too long 
 
EC processes involve so many transaction costs only worth it if tender is for large amount. Note: The 
respondent went on to make some unsolicited, negative comments on credibility of other NGO supported 
by the EC and on use of UN trust funds. 
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Figure 4. Visiting the Police EOD training in Garowe, Puntland 




This visit was the first of three carried out as part of the Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy 
and Actions -2002-2004, as set out in the Terms of Reference (TOR) of Commission 
Framework Contract EUROPEAID/116548/C/SV.  
 
The visit was carried out in comparative short notice after the New Year break, after having been 
requested just before the break. The success of the arrangements was is entirely due to the 
effort made by the EC Delegation staff in Nairobi and the UNDP staff in the mine action program 
office in Garowe in Puntland, Somalia. Particular thanks are due to Juliet Chelimo of the EC 
Delegation. 
 
Visit structure  
 
The EC Delegation in Nairobi is 
responsible for EC activities in 
Somalia, and all international 
flights from Europe to Somalia 
pass through Nairobi. This 
necessitated travel via Kenya. 
Mission travel to Somalia is by 
ECHO flight; flights do not arrive 
in Garowe every day so in order 
to minimize travel time and cost 
the field visit was made before 
visiting the delegation. However 
the visit was greatly enhanced 
by the team being accompanied 
by the responsible officer 
 
The team was able to visit 3 projects:  
• Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC)  
• Police EOD training 
• Phase II Somalia Landmine Impact Survey 
 
Personnel spoken to included:  
• Director of Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC)  
• Technical Advisor Swedish Rescue Services Association (SRSA)  
• Survey Team from Survey Action Centre (SAC)  
• United Mine Action Service (UNMAS) QA Monitor  
• UNDP Mine Action Country Manager 
• EC delegation staff (on return from Somalia). 
 
Major Findings  
 
The Team concentrated on the investigation of strategic issues in line with the TOR and in 
compliance with Article 14 of the Regulation.  
 
The strategic issues included: 
• Deconcentration  
• How projects are initiated 
• Relationship with UNDP and the Mine Action Centre 
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The Team investigated the impact of Deconcentration on mine action projects. In essence, the 
Team found that Deconcentration should benefit the planning and monitoring of EC 
contributions to mine action, and, furthermore, that it was seen as a positive step by both the 
Delegation and the implementing agencies. Deconcentration should optimise the relevance of 
project selection (see below) and allow the contracting process to take account of local 
organisational structures. 
 
The Delegation staff made the point that Brussels should of course continue with resource 
allocation and overall strategy – They also suggested that in this regard Deconcentration should 
be liberating for Brussels in that it would allow Brussels to escape the drag of minor detail. The 
downside may mean more work for the Delegations. They will need to keep in line with EC 
strategic focus on mine action. It would also appear to mean that Delegations will need access 
to technical expertise in mine issues. This is discussed below. The Delegation personnel 
however were clear in their overall positive view of Deconcentration. 
 
Project Selection  
 
In the past, project selection has been done centrally in Brussels, in consultation with the 
Delegation.  As a result, there is little or no reference to the mine issue in Somalia equivalent of 
the ‘Country Strategy Program.’ Deconcentration should remove this artificial segregation and 
help the Delegations ensure that projects selected are the most relevant to country needs. The 
Delegation Staff in Nairobi suggest that they will be able to make use of input from all agencies 
active in mine action plus – significantly - those agencies whose projects are impacted by mine 
contamination.  The Delegation also thought that more use could be made of tendering 
processes to ensure that mine action implementers work is relevant to the overall problems of 
the community, which would assist in ensuring compliance with Paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the 
Regulation. 
 
Relationships with UNDP and National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) 
 
UNDP have a special role in mine action as a result of the division of labour between UN 
agencies and a mandated role of the UN in mine action. Furthermore, this role is recognised in 
Paragraph 3 of Article 8 of the Regulation. The role of the NMAA75  is also recognised in 
Paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Regulation. Therefore, where UNDP works on capacity building 
of a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), this means that it can be  inefficient and possibly 
inappropriate to ask for UNDP or the NMAA (which is a “natural monopoly” in economic terms) 
to bid on competitively selected projects, as asking other organisations to bid against UNDP or 
the NMAA in this regard would not be fully compliant with the above mentioned paragraphs of 
the Regulation, as Paragraph 2 of Article 4 and Paragraph 19 of the Preamble make clear the 
need for transparency and competitive tendering.  
 
However, discussion with the Respondents has suggested these requirements are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, especially where UNDP is acting as an agent of the donors, and 
where synergy with other donors is allowing UNDP transaction costs to be shared. This could 
also help solve the problem – from a technical perspective – of how to provide technical 
expertise in mine action to the Delegations. However, both transparency and efficiency 
requirements would then make it necessary to ensure that, in general, both UNDP (and the 
NMAA) are agents and coordinators and NOT implementers of projects. Contracting is 
considered in more detail in Chapter 3 of this report. 
                                                 
75 In this case the NMAA role is currently filled by the “Puntland Mine Action Centre” 
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Nevertheless, the Delegation representatives did express some reservations (based on their 
general experience) about getting UNDP to act in this regard. There may be need for the EC to 
empower itself as the ‘customer’ in its relationship with the UN in the mine action context.  
Alternative sources of technical advice may include provision of centralised specialist advice in 
Brussels (which may be expensive and procedurally difficult) or – as recommended by the 
Delegation in Nairobi – making more use of the existing Framework contract system to access 
technical expertise for project appraisal and evaluation. 
 
Problems with existing structures 
 
One problem raised by UNDP was difficulty on dealing with EC documentation. There may be a 
role for further use of the concept of Vade Mecum guidance notes, as used in other EC 
processes. It was suggested that 
Deconcentration could also help as the 
Delegations would be able to provide 
assistance. A second problem was the delay 
involved from the process of project selection 
to the disbursement of funds. Discussions 
suggest that a Vade Mecum should assist in 
this regard as agencies could be advised of 
the likely delays. There may also be scope for 
more clear direction of funding requests to the 
EC funding streams more suited for the project 
in question. For example, given that landmine 
impact surveys are so important for the 
subsequent planning of mine action there may 
be a case for using ECHO funds to support 
them in a timelier manner. 
Apparently the problem with delays is also 
exacerbated by the short-term nature of 
funding. Both UNDP and the EC Delegation 
made strong cases for re-organising fund 
disbursement so that projects had more 
certainty of funding over several years. In 
particular, this would allow implementers to 
invest in technology that could make mine 
action more cost effective. Thirdly, there appears to be a systemic problem with building in risk 
management for such projects. Somalia is an example of a project that is at the end of a very 
logistic chain and in an area of a fragile security – both typical attributes of mine action 
programs. Both of these issues have caused problems with mine action in Somalia and, frankly, 
shouldn’t have been much of a surprise. It would be helpful to use some type of mechanism to 
cover such predictable risks; a Vade Mecum would be a suitable vector for explaining how this 




The visit to Somalia provided a useful insight into the practical application of EC contributions to 
mine action. The good working relationship of EC Delegation staff and UNDP personnel was 
reflected in the smooth logistic operation of the visit. Furthermore, active and enthusiastic 
contributions by field personnel provided some useful feedback for the Team.  
Figure 5. Unloading medical supplies at the airstrip 
outside Garowe. Projects at the end of such long 
logistic chains should build in more contingencies for 
risk management into their budgets. 
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This visit was the second of three carried out as 
part of the Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy 
and Actions -2002-2004, as set out in the Terms 
of Reference (TOR) of Commission Framework 
Contract EUROPEAID/116548/C/SV.  
 
The visit was carried out shortly after the New 
Year break, having been requested just before 
the break. The success of the arrangements was 
due to the effort made by the UNDP staff in the 
UNDP Country Office and the staff of the 
Azerbaijan National Mine Action Authority 
(ANAMA). Thanks are also due to the Special 
Envoy of the European Commission to 
Azerbaijan, Mr de Vries, for establishing the 
necessary contacts with UNDP and ANAMA. 
 
Visit structure  
 
The EC does not have a full 
Delegation in Azerbaijan but is 
represented by “Europa 
House” a representative office. 
Mission travel to Azerbaijan 
was by commercial flight; 
however flights do not arrive in 
Baku every day so in order to 
minimize travel time and cost 
the field visit was made before 
visiting Europa House. The 
field visit was greatly enhanced 
by the team being 
accompanied by the ANAMA 
Director of Operations. 
 
The team was able to visit 6 sites including:  
• 1 battle area clearance (BAC) site 
• 1 minefield clearance site involving mechanical equipment 
• 1 minefield clearance site involving mine detecting dogs 
• 1 Community-based Mine Risk Education (MRE) project 
• 2 operational bases operated by ANAMA 
 
Personnel spoken to included:  
• Director and staff of ANAMA  
• Task site managers of 2 national NGOs implementing mine action 
• Representative of RONCO, an American consulting company providing technical 
assistance to ANAMA 
• UNDP Resident Representative and relevant UNDP staff 
• Europa House Coordinator Mr Nicos Antoniou 
Figure 6. After clearance, the Battle Area 
Clearance (BAC) team mark cleared properties. 
Figure 7. Community-based Mine Risk Education (MRE) in 
Azerbaijan. The local mine signs are visible on the screen. 
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• Courtesy call to Azerbaijan Government Official responsible for EC Liaison meeting with 
Technical Advisor Mr Alfred Supik and Executive Director Asgar Alakbarov 
 
Major Findings  
 
The Team concentrated on the investigation of strategic issues in line with the TOR and in 
compliance with Article 14 of the Regulation.76  
 
The strategic issues included: 
 
• Deconcentration  
• How projects are initiated 
• Relationship with UNDP and the Mine Action Centre 
• Problems with existing structures 




The Team investigated the potential impact of Deconcentration on mine action projects. In 
essence, the Team found that, as in Somalia, Deconcentration should benefit the planning and 
monitoring of EC contributions to mine action. Deconcentration should improve the local 
relevance of project selection (see below) and allow the contracting process to take greater 
account of local organisational structures. 
 
Europa House made the point that as a representative office they do not have the power of a 
delegation, though they expect to gain the status of a full delegation within the year. The current 
situation for them therefore reflects the condition of an “undeconcentrated” Delegation in that 
project decisions are made in Brussels and enacted by local staff. This became particularly 
significant in the case of the Landmine Impact Survey which was funded by the EC. This is 
mentioned again below and is discussed in more depth in the main text of the report. 
 
Project Selection  
 
In the past, project selection has been done centrally in Brussels. Deconcentration should help 
reduce this long-distance approach and help the Delegations ensure that projects selected are 
the most relevant to country needs. However, there may be need for an initial process in order 
to train the new Delegation staffs in EC responses to mine action issues, in Baku it appeared 
that the EC representative office were not knowledgeable about mine action issues as these 
were issues dealt with centrally and they saw their key role as implementing Brussels decisions. 
 
Relationships with UNDP and local Mine Action Centre (MAC) 
 
UNDP gave the team excellent cooperation during this trip and were very cognisant of their 
responsibility to the donors. In particular, The UNDP Resident Representative spelt out the need 
for the UNDP country office to ensure that donor concerns about visibility and financial 
accountability were met by them. They accepted suggestions that this might need a re-
statement of the roles and relationships between the EC and the UNDP country office. They felt 
that this could be achieved at a country level, given that UNDP have already gone through the 
equivalent of a Deconcentration process.  
 
The relationship between UNDP and ANAMA seemed sound. UNDP made the point that 
Azerbaijan does not score well on international measures of corruption (they quoted an 
independent report by Transparency International) and that UNDP therefore have a role to play 
                                                 
76 Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries 
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on behalf of donors in this regard. It may therefore seem paradoxical that UNDP have removed 
their full time technical advisor who was positioned in ANAMA but, as a response, they have 
also resolved to continue to provide periodic technical advice and assessment on a consultancy 
basis. This should also be considered realistic in view of the comparative small size of the 
Azerbaijan mine action program. It also highlights a potential future modality for supporting mine 
action programs that do not have an existing international coordination presence (such as 
Vietnam). 
 
ANAMA were also very cooperative in every way and made a copy of a previous international 
evaluation available to the Team. One small problem was that they continued to expect the 
Team to evaluate ANAMA and were not initially clear about the ToR of the visit; this may have 
been exacerbated by the fact that they had never been evaluated by the EC before and were 
therefore expecting to be assessed by the Team. This was resolved amicably. 
 
Problems with existing structures 
 
UNDP felt very strongly that a re-statement of the relative roles of UNDP and the EC Delegation 
should be done, as this had proved problematic in the conduct of the Landmine Impact Survey 
by the Survey Action Centre, which had run into problems in the early stages in terms of 
disputes over budgets, leading to subsequent delays. Although this will be considered in more 
depth in the analysis of survey implementation that will be included in the main report, the key 
point raised by UNDP was that they felt that they had “all of the responsibility for managing the 
survey on behalf of the donor, and none of the authority”. The UNDP Resident Representative 
endorsed a suggestion by the Team that, in future, the contractual chain and individual 
responsibilities for surveys should be clarified and serious consideration given to improving the 
EC contract documents in order to make them clearer and more specific. 
 
ANAMA also mentioned problems with delays in the EC funding process (as discussed in the 
Somalia Report). They were also concerned about the cost implications of the number of 
“middle men” involved in the funding process, although with an undeconcentrated EC office it 
would be unrealistic to expect projects to be managed by remote control from Brussels without 
any assistance from the UNDP country office.  As in the case of Somalia, there is a need for 
clarification of the role, and in particular the value added, by the various partners involved at all 





The visit to Azerbaijan provided a very useful insight into the practical application of EC 
contributions to mine action, particularly in the case of an undeconcentrated local EC presence. 
The good working relationship with ANAMA staff and UNDP personnel was reflected in the 
smooth logistic operation of the visit. Furthermore, active and enthusiastic contributions by 
AMAMA management and UNDP provided some useful feedback for the Team who 
considered the visit a success. 
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This visit was the last of three carried out as part of 
the Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and 
Actions -2002-2004, as set out in the Terms of 
Reference (TOR) of Commission Framework 
Contract EUROPEAID/116548/C/SV. The visit was 
carried out at comparatively short notice after the 
New Year break, having been requested just before 
the break. The local visits were arranged by the EC 
Delegation staff in Sarajevo. 
 
 
Visit structure  
 
The EC Delegation in Sarajevo has been 
responsible for EC activities in Bosnia since 
Deconcentration in June 2004. Mission travel to 
Bosnia is much simpler than in previous years due 
to a number of commercial airlines now serving 
Sarajevo Airport on a daily basis.  Both 
Deconcentration and ease of access are in contrast to activities in Somalia and Azerbaijan 
which were reported in the earlier visit reports.   
 
Due to the limitations of the time 
available to the Team, only one 
Consultant conducted this visit, though 
regular contact by phone was 
maintained between both members of 
the team. The consultant was able to 
visit two projects, both parts of the 
Bosnian Civil Defence Teams 
supported by the EC in both entities of 
Bosnia (the Bosnian Federation and 
the Republica Srbska). February is 
mid-winter in Bosnia and this limited 
the opportunity to visit field activity.  
 
However, with the help of the 
Delegation the Consultant was able 
to discuss strategic issues with a number of agencies: 
 
• EC Delegation 
• Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) 
• UNDP Chief Technical Advisor to BHMAC 
• Slovenian International Trust Fund (Bosnia Office) 
• Civil Defence Authority (Federation and Republica Srbska) 
• Norwegian Peoples Aid 
• Armorgroup (an Anglo-American mine action company) 
 
Major Findings  
Figure 8. Snow covering the approaches to a 
minefield being cleared by an EC-funded 
team. Projects in countries with such climatic 
conditions must take account of the effect this 
can have on productivity. 
Figure 9. One of the Civil Protection EOD teams funded by 
the EC. 
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The Team concentrated on the investigation of strategic issues in line with the TOR and in 
compliance with Article 14 of the Regulation. However, the relative maturity of the mine action 
program in Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially compared to the other programs that have 
been visited as part of this assessment) has meant that the Team has had more access to 
detailed information than the other reports. This is reflected in the content of this report.  
 
The strategic issues included: 
• Deconcentration  
• How projects are initiated 
• Relationship with UNDP and the Mine Action Centre 




The Team investigated the impact of Deconcentration on mine action projects. In essence, the 
Team found that, as in Somalia and Azerbaijan, Deconcentration should benefit the planning 
and monitoring of EC contributions to mine action.  Furthermore, it was seen as a positive step 
by both the Delegation and the implementing agencies. Deconcentration should optimise the 
relevance of project selection (see below) and allow the contracting process to take account of 
local organisational structures. 
 
However, the Delegation reported that in many respects the Deconcentration process was not 
yet fully implemented. The Delegation reported that, over the period covered by this Report, 
project selection and contracting processes tended to be retained in Brussels with only 
‘implementation’ left in the hands of the Delegation. This presented problems where contracts 
included difficulties that were visible locally but less visible at a distance. However, this problem 
was reported as being general across all sectors and not just in mine action, so it seems that 
this is likely to be ‘teething trouble’ with a new process, rather than the fault of a specific office or 
programme. As in Somalia and Azerbaijan, it became clear that the Delegation needed access 
to independent technical expertise in mine issues. This is discussed below.  
 
Project Selection  
 
The Delegation reported that there were main three modalities for EC support for mine action in 
Bosnia. These were: 
 
• Contracted mine action in support of reconstruction projects run by the Delegation.  
 
• Mine action funded through the Horizontal Budget Line. As mentioned above, Brussels 
continued to select projects funded through this method during the period covered by this 
Report. Funds were usually channelled through the Slovenian International Trust Fund 
(ITF). ITF is a low cost program (its management fee is only 3%) and is attractive in terms of 
‘synergy’ as it includes a pledge from the United States to match funds from other donors.   
 
• Institutional strengthening of mine action, through support of the Bosnian Civil Protection 
Authority (CPA), which has teams operating in both Entities (the Bosnian Federation and 
the Republica Srbska). 
 
Full implementation of Deconcentration should eventually reduce the problems with project 
selection and help the Delegation ensure that projects selected are the most relevant to country 
needs. The other problems with these various modalities are set out below. 
 
Relationships with UNDP and BHMAC 
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UNDP continues to have a close cooperation with the BHMAC, though the current Chief 
Technical Advisor is due to retire. UNDP are apparently considering not replacing him – whilst 
this reflects the genuine capacity development in BHMAC this could have a negative impact on 
the availability of access to impartial technical advice given the condition of the mine action 
sector (see below). BHMAC also remain cooperative and open, as does the office of the ITF. 
There is some debate between BHMAC and ITF about how best to conduct monitoring, which 
is also discussed below. 
 
Problems with existing structures 
 
There remain persistent - though unconfirmed - rumours of a lack of transparent behaviour in 
the Bosnian mine action sector, especially concerning the ownership of a number of mine action 
implementing organisations. Investigating these allegations is outside the terms of reference of 
this visit and Bosnia is notorious for generating such gossip; nevertheless this is also a strategic 
issue in that the current structures could make the EC potentially liable for possible criticism in 
the future if such an allegation were ever to be substantiated. However, the ongoing 
Deconcentration process should increasingly allow the existing structures to be modified in 
order to further reduce the risk of such problems, as the Delegation is in a much better position 
than staff in Brussels to identify and assess the provenance of such rumours. Furthermore, 
modification of the existing structures could improve transparency and help defend the good 
reputation of the EC in Bosnia.  
 
There is a general lack of access to independent technical advice, both in the locally-managed 
projects in support of reconstruction and also projects selected through the ITF. Whilst the 
Delegation is able to ensure that mine action in support of projects is “doing the right job” in 
terms of working for the appropriate reconstruction task, Delegation staff clearly do not have the 
specialised technical skills to determine whether the contractors (be they NGO or commercial 
organisations) are “doing the job right”.  This is the case in many technical areas where funding 
is not sufficient to allow the Delegation to include a particular specialisation in staff recruitment.  
The need for improved technical monitoring is strongly supported by reports from the 
Delegation, BHMAC and ITF offices, that several mines have been missed over the period 
covered by this Assessment, though none of these missed mines are reported to be on EC 
projects.  
 
The ITF process is generally sound, and has many attractive attributes as outlined above. 
However, there are some areas for potential improvement that could further reduce risk for the 
EC and improve quality of the output. These are: 
 
• The ITF Country Director reported that the EC had directed that only “commercial” demining 
organisations should be considered for EC funded projects managed by the ITF. However, 
when this was followed up the ITF representative told us that it had, in fact, been an ITF 
decision to exclude NGOs.  This goes against the principle that all qualified NGOs77  should 
also be allowed to bid alongside qualified commercial organisations in order to ensure true 
competition amongst the largest possible pool of implementers, and the EC should have 
been informed of this decision when it was made. 
 
• Typical ITF contracts are around 50,000€. This is not sufficient to encourage new 
organisations to enter the marketplace (the minimum figure likely to encourage a European 
organisation to start operations in Bosnia is around 300,000€ in order to cover the costs of 
                                                 
77 On a separate, but related, point, the EC Delegation reported that the Norwegian mine action NGO 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was not eligible for EC funding, as Norway was not in the EC. Given the 
lack of mine action implementing organisations a more flexible and common-sense approach would seem to 
be appropriate, in order to include as many technically competent organisations as possible. 
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starting up, and perhaps as much as 1M€ if organisations using higher efficiency clearance 
methods which require capital investment are to bid). This creates a significant incumbent 
advantage and thus a strong disincentive to greater efficiency.  The market would be 
strengthened simply by ensuring that work funded through the ITF was let in significantly 
larger lots. The ITF have reported that this would be possible if they were directed to do so. 
This would also act to reduce transaction costs as it can cost a similar amount to manage 
(and evaluate) a small project as it does a larger one. 
 
• As mentioned above, the ITF contracting process is generally sound, though the ITF tender 
evaluation committee does not always include an independent technical specialist. As a 
result, the committee may not always be able to see the potential technical flaws in 
proposals. The EC should ensure that sufficient technical support is always made available 
for this purpose. 
 
• The ITF appear to offer a comprehensive monitoring service (projects are subject to 
constant monitoring by staff from one of two local companies accredited as monitoring 
organisations) however this process appears to be flawed for a number of reasons, 
including: 
 
o There are only two monitoring companies, both of which have current contracts, 
which means there is no competition and limited transparency) 
o The 100% monitoring process is expensive, and probably unnecessary, as proper 
random and unannounced inspections could almost certainly achieve the same 
result. This would also reduce the risk of a too-comfortable personal relationship 
developing between the monitors and the monitored and the subsequent loss of 
objectivity which could ensue.  
 
The institutional strengthening project – the support of the CPA teams – is generally successful. 
The personnel appear to be knowledgeable and well motivated. They work hard to maintain 
vehicles donated by the EC many years ago (1996) and have also developed several projects 
in which the Teams from the two Entities cooperate, such as common equipment maintenance 
capacity. This cooperation alone is a major success in the Bosnian context. However, the 
project has some problems in terms of sustainability, which will be presented in more detail in 
the Final Report. It was also suggested that, by concentrating on that aspect of institutional 
strengthening (and not therefore providing direct support to the BHMAC) that the EC had lost an 
important opportunity to have influence in strategic issues – and hence there was significantly 
diminished visibility for the important EC contributions.  
 
 
The consultant heard positive reports about the conduct of the Landmine Impact Survey 
(compared with the other visits) though the UNDP CTA added an opinion that this was due to 
the fact that BHMAC was comparatively mature when the LIS team arrived and was able to 
encourage the LIS team to modify their activities to meet local needs.  This supports the view 
that such flexibility is possible when enough encouragement is given. The BHMAC and UNDP 
CTA seemed less impressed with efforts by UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining to insist that they use the “IMSMA” management software.  While they 
remain open, they feel that without improvements IMSMA does not yet offer any added value 
over their existing software. 
 
The Consultant also investigated opinions on project documentation, which had been reported 
as problematic in Somalia (and to some extent in Azerbaijan). The CPA staff reported that they 
did not have any problems with EC tender documentation (in contrast to opinions heard in 
Somalia) though they did say they had had problems in early days. They suggested that training 
in the documentation (perhaps through an outreach program) might have helped them at that 
time. 
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The visit to Bosnia provided a useful insight into the practical application of EC contributions to 
mine action in a mature mine action program, and highlighted some areas for potential 
improvement.  The visit to a delegation which had been Deconcentrated earlier provided a 
useful counterpoint to the other visits.  The cooperation of all respondents was vital to the 
Consultant’s progress in developing these findings. Whilst there appear to be several problems, 
these should be set in context; much good work is going on in Bosnia and there is a general 
willingness to address problems and improve.  Furthermore, the ability of the Consultant to raise 
these issues is wholly due to the encouragement given to the Team in the Terms of Reference, 
to conduct a thorough assessment of all aspects of the programme. 
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Funding of Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) has taken up a significant proportion of EC mine 
action resources over the period 2002 to 2004.  Evaluating these LIS would easily absorb all of 
the resources available to this Assessment.  Fortunately, much work has already been done to 
this end by an Evaluation Mission carried out on behalf of the Survey Action Center (SAC) by 
Scanteam of Norway and Demex of Denmark, during the period May to October 2003.  This 
Assessment is therefore able to rely on the excellent work done78 by Scanteam/Demex79 in 





This Annex is set out in three sections: 
 
 Section One: A summary of the structure and methodology of the Scanteam  evaluation 
 Section Two: A summary of the major findings of the Scanteam evaluation 
 Section Three: further observations made by this Assessment Team on the Scanteam 
methodology and the survey process 
 
Section One  
 
(Based on text extracted from the Scanteam report) 
 
[Comments by the EC Global Mine Assessment 2002-4  evaluation team are included in square 
brackets] 
 
When the Global Landmine Survey (GLS) program was launched it was envisaged that it would 
end once surveys had been carried out in all the major mine-affected countries.  The program is 
now considered to be more than 50% complete, and it was therefore considered timely to 
undertake a formal and independent evaluation of the LIS process.  The evaluation is to form 
part of a broader strategic review of the GLS program.  Based on an open tender process, 
Scanteam of Norway in collaboration with Demex of Denmark was awarded the contract to 
carry out the evaluation.  The evaluation took place May-September 2003 with field visits to 
seven GLS countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Thailand 
and Yemen.  Interviews were carried out in five donor countries (Canada, Denmark, Norway, 
Switzerland and the US) as well as with UN agencies in New York and Geneva.  Telephone 
interviews and E-mail exchanges were used with a number of key informants. 
 
The objectives of the evaluation were two-fold: 
 
 Examine the current GLS organizational structure and LIS methodologies: procedures, tools 
and assumptions 
 
 Evaluate the utility, efficacy and use of the survey results  
 
In order to structure the study, the issues contained in the [Scanteam] TOR were structured into 
four sets of key issues, which are then subsequently treated in separate chapters in [the 
Scanteam] report: the planning phase of the LIS; the implementation; the outputs and their 
impact; and finally overall issues that affect a LIS process and its results.   
                                                 
78 Comments are made based on annexes F-.doc 
79 Subsequently referred to as ‘Scanteam’ for brevity. 
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Based on the evaluation of the above two areas, [Scanteam] was able to make 
recommendations for improvements to the overall effectiveness and efficiency of impact surveys 
[these are summarised in Section Two below]. 
 
Section Two  
 
(Based on text extracted from the Scanteam report) 
 
 [The Scanteam Report lists major findings, both positive and critical, in the opening pages of 





• The mine action community has been able to come together to establish the Survey Working Group 
(SWG) and GLS through a collaborative and deliberative process unheard of in any other sector of 
development and emergency action.   
 
• The LIS produces reports, databases, and other outputs that provide a qualitatively better and more 
accurate description and analysis of the mines/UXO problems, and thus provide a better basis for 
mine action (MA) decisions. 
 
• The LIS has developed a methodology and standards which are recognized and followed by key 
actors involved in landmine surveying.  These are set out in Protocols and Advisory Notes that are 
easily available and which are subject to a process of continuous discussion and updating. 
 
• …The LIS strengthens the argument for allocating national resources to MA as the factual basis 
regarding the mine/UXO problem and what to do about it is both qualitatively and quantitatively better.  
Finally, the LIS is a major support to national authorities and local mine actors in their own fund raising 
dialogue with the donor community. 
 
• The GLS is evolving…including the use and updating of the Information Management  System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA) database, follow-up use of the LIS results through…Planning, etc.   
 
• Donors do not use the LIS results directly, but are interested in seeing that partner authorities do – it 
provides an assurance that MA resources are being planned better. 
 
• National authorities by and large are using the LIS, and in most cases trying to shape national MA 




• The LIS is a costly undertaking… 
  
• The implementation of the LIS should be…based on international competitive bidding... 
 
• Whether the same entity can both plan and implement a LIS should be considered... 
 
• The LIS is currently structured as a "stand alone" event and is an externally driven and defined 
process that is poorly integrated into national tools and tasks:  
 
• The overall plan…needs to be sorted out with the national government.  If the LIS requires a separate 
MoU…this should be in place before the project planning begins.   
                                                 
80 It is clear from the text of the Report that Scanteam have done their best to be objective and to offer 
constructive criticism, phrased in terms of how things could be improved. 
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• The project document should be subjected to the normal scrutiny…before final approval. 
 
• The standard questionnaire should be reviewed for a focus on collecting only "first order" data.  Other 
variables should only be included if it is clear that they will be used by actors for important decisions 
 
• QA resources should be spent more evenly across the three dimensions of data quality: (i) is the 
survey asking the right questions (relevance)? (ii) does the survey generate answers to the questions 
being asked (validity, reliability)?, (iii) is data integrity…maintained? 
 
• Local partner institutions for the implementation of the field survey should be identified, to ensure that 
learning from the LIS survey process is internalized by national institutions and not just simply by the 
individuals engaged. 
 
• Active involvement of local social science skills should be encouraged… 
 
• Local operators generally do not use the LIS for their planning, in part because funding often 
determines where they work – donor behavior becomes a blockage to more rational MA resource use 
through the project approach. 
 
• There is a need for MA actors to come together to see how the LIS can be used for more rational 
sector resource allocations.  National concerns and priorities should be a major benchmark for 
individual organizations' priorities. 
 
• The LIS database is a key output of the process and its value needs to be ensured through (i) easy 
and open access to both data and results, (ii) a program of continued and structured updating of key 
variables, (iii) accessibility in terms of low-cost and easy-to-use software platform (relative to situations 
in differing countries).   
 
• Having IMSMA as the standard database for mine action makes sense from a pragmatic efficiency 
point of view.  The challenge is to develop it in two areas: (i) making transfer of LIS data to other 
databases easier… and (ii) make its access to MA operators easier, so that data are more directly 
user-friendly.   
 
• SAC should avoid direct management of LIS and focus strategic management of the GLS process 
and its accomplishments.  A key role is collecting, analyzing, disseminating and discussing "lessons 
learned"… 
 
• The SWG Protocols/Advisory Notes provide helpful standards, though there is a need to accept 
flexible adaptations to country specific situations.   
 
• The SAC management/board selection processes are opaque – formal accountability seems difficult 




In the opinion of this EC evaluation team the TOR given to Scanteam were, fair, broad, and 
inclusive.  They provided Scanteam with the remit to look at all levels of the survey process from 
the strategic to the technical.  There is some question as to whether the resources available to 
Scanteam were sufficient, given the inclusive nature of the TOR, especially as it appears that 
the quality assurance monitoring (QAM) process that shadowed the original survey processes 
appears in some cases to have had a very limited remit, i.e.  merely to ensure that the various 
LIS were carrying out their missions in line with their own project document (as Scanteam puts it 
“doing the job right”), rather than to consider whether the survey methodology was appropriate 
(“doing the right job”). 
 
This Team finds is able to fully support the findings of Scanteam.  If anything, they could have 
been summarised more succinctly as follows: 
Global assessment of EC mine policy and actions: 2002-2004.  Final report.  March 2005 
 
ANNEX I:  LIS EVALUATION                       ANNEX  J Page  4 
 
 The LIS process is of value to the international community, especially in its role to report on 
landmine and UXO contamination and as a means of assisting in planning and resource 
allocation 
 
 The LIS process is evolving, which means it should be able to take account of the various 
shortcomings found during the Scanteam evaluation process 
 
 LIS are too often stand alone processes that do not make use of existing social science 
institutes or personnel 
 
 ‘The net result has been that the questionnaire is being felt as too large and unwieldy’81 
 
 LIS are not sufficiently integrated into strategic planning processes, although some progress 
is being made in this regard 
 
 The use of IMSMA remains problematic and needs major review: the software should be 
freely available so that mine action implementing agencies can make use of it to make 
reports, and more thought should be given to comments from the field on its structure 
[though this team notes that GICHD are undertaking a review of IMSMA at the time of this 
evaluation]. 
 
 The SWG/SAC/GLS processes are not transparent.  There is a potential conflict of interest 
in that many members of the SWG are also survey implementers: surveys should be let by 
competitive tender using international competitive bidding processes and open to all 
qualified organisations – including commercial demining agencies or survey companies. 
 
This team also has some other findings that it would add to the findings of the Scanteam report: 
 
 The methodology of the LIS process is slightly skimmed over by the Scanteam report.  If 
anything, the Scanteam report places too much emphasis on explaining its own (i.e.  
Scanteam) methodology in comparison with the amount of time explaining the SAC/GLS 
methodology.  In particular, there is, in the opinion of this Team, some doubt about one 
aspect of the SAC ‘Protocols82’ referred to in the Scanteam report, namely the process of 
false negative sampling.  In short, the false negative technique is a way of reducing the 
sample size (and hence time and cost) and works thus: 
 
o Survey teams enter a region of the affected country, and question the regional 
authorities as to whether they have any mine/UXO contamination present in their 
region.  In the event that the regional authorities say yes, all sub-regions in the 
region are surveyed.  In the event that the authorities say ‘no,’ a small number of the 
communities are sampled.  If they all say ‘no’ the region is discounted; if one or 
more say ‘yes’, the original response of the regional authorities is regarded as a 
‘false negative’ and the region is treated as if contaminated.   
 
The problem with this approach is that contamination is not a truly random process (there is 
strong serial correlation between one site of contamination and another, as contamination 
tends to follow ‘confrontation lines’) and so there is some doubt to whether such a sampling 
process can really provide a true picture of the extent of contamination.  Furthermore, 
surveys have tended to be planned on the assumption that there will be no ‘false negatives’ 
and this has resulted in the need to extend (and hence re-finance) surveys after the ‘false 
                                                 
81 This is a direct quote from Page 24 of the Scanteam report and this Team believes it deserves greater 
emphasis.   
82 The Protocols are not easily available from the SAC website. 
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negative’ approach was found to be erroneous.  Indeed, this Team is aware that at least two 
surveys (Cambodia and Afghanistan) had to greatly extend the scope of the survey in such 
a fashion.  The Cambodia eventually had to sample all villages (i.e.  conduct a census rather 
than a survey) as a result of problems with the false negative methodology.  However, in the 
end this did provide a more comprehensive idea of where – in general terms – the 
contamination existed. 
 
 The second problem with the LIS methodology is that it has – in the opinion of several 
deminers who have discussed this with the Team – drifted too far from earlier survey 
techniques which were themselves (quite rightly) criticised for concentrating too much on 
logistic and task planning for mine clearance.  However, one important element of earlier 
(often called ‘Level One’) surveys was that they did tend to place an emphasis on trying to 
fix the location of mined areas to a greater or lesser extent (though there is a limit to the 
accuracy achievable through a questionnaire based process.  In the opinion of this Team 
there is scope for taking the middle ground and using the participatory rural appraisal 
methodology of the LIS process but ensuring that some effort is taken to fix the general 
extent of the problem as well as its impact (indeed this is a process that some of the LIS 
management teams have followed at a local level).   
 
 Finally, the Team also heard about some problems with the contracting mechanisms used 
to select survey implementing partners.  It is very important that the EC use its considerable 
power as a major donor to seek more open and competitive methods for selecting surveying 
organisations – this could mean also that the role of SAC should be more carefully designed 




The Scanteam report does explain many of the problems with IMSMA.  However in the opinion 
of this team, whilst there is a valid reason for using IMSMA as an ‘off the shelf’ option for new 
surveys (and indeed new mine action programs) there is nothing to be gained by insisting that 
established programs (such as Bosnia, Cambodia or Croatia) should convert to IMSMA.  There 
is also some concern about the understanding of the concept of ‘standard’.  It is one thing to set 
a standard for the content and quality of survey reports, and another to then insist that reports 
are completed in a software package that is not generally available.  This is particularly 
aggravating for demining agencies who would be probably be happy to report using IMSMA 
generated forms if only they could get a copy of the software (at least one database manager 
has distributed ‘bootleg’ copies of IMSMA in order to facilitate easier reporting).  One condition 
of further supporting of the IMSMA process should be the use of conditionality: IMSMA should 
be made downloadable freeware and agencies should cease insisting the conversion of 




Surveys have usually been planned on the assumption that there will be no ‘false negatives’ 
and this has resulted in the need to extend (and hence re-finance) surveys after the ‘false 
negative’ approach was found to be unjustified. Surveys using false negative sampling should 
be planned to show a ‘maximum’ and ‘minimum’ timescale. 
 
The use of IMSMA remained problematic over the period covered by this report and needs 
major review: the software should be freely available so that all mine action implementing 
agencies can make use of it to make reports, and more thought should be given to comments 
from the field on its structure (though the evaluation team notes that GICHD are undertaking a 
review of IMSMA at the time of this evaluation). 
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As noted in the Scanteam report, the SWG/SAC processes are not fully transparent. There is a 
potential conflict of interest in that many members of the SWG are also survey implementers: 
surveys should be let by competitive tender using international competitive bidding processes 
and open to all qualified organisations – including commercial demining agencies or survey 
companies. It is the opinion of the Team that SAC should be encouraged to consider itself as 
the custodian of standards rather than as an implementer.  
 
The Team have heard some evidence that at least one survey was over-priced. The European 
Commission is strongly recommended to negotiate the most advantageous terms possible for 
supporting future surveys. 
 
